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Unconstitutional but Entrenched 
PUTTING UOCAVA AND VOTING RIGHTS FOR 
PERMANENT EXPATRIATES ON ASOUND 
CONSTITUTIONAL FOOTING 
Brian C. Kaltt 
INTRODUCTION 
Eligible voters who have left the United States 
permanently have the right to vote in federal elections as though 
they still live at their last stateside address. They need not be 
residents of their former states, be eligible to vote in state or local 
elections, or pay any state or local taxes. Federal law-the 
Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act 
(UOCAVA) 1-forces states to let these former residents vote for 
the President, the Senate, and the House this way. 
There are several constitutional problems with all of this. 
Congress heard about many of these problems in the hearings 
and debates that led to the passage of OCVRA (UOCAVA's 
predecessor, which first enfranchised permanent expatriates this 
way) in 1975.2 While supporting other parts of OCVRA, the 
Department of Justice and some members of Congress presented 
an aggressive constitutional case against forcing states to let 
permanent expatriates vote.3 OCVRA's proponents responded 
with constitutional arguments of their own,4 but the bill's passage 
t Professor of Law and Harold Norris Faculty Scholar, Michigan State 
University College of Law. Thanks to the participants in the MSU College of Law 
summer workshop, to Robert W. Bennett, John Fortier, Alan Gura, Mae Kuykendall, 
Michael Lawrence, and Jorge E. Souss for their helpful input; and to Barbara Bean, 
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t Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, Pub. L. No. 99-410, 
100 Stat. 924 (1986) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C.A. §§ 20301-20310 (West 2015)). 
2 Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-203, 89 Stat. 
1142 (1976). 
3 See infra Section II.A.2. 
4 See infra Section II.A.l. 
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seems to have rested on something else: a view that Congress 
should leave the resolution of such constitutional questions solely 
to the courts, especially given that litigation over the 
enfranchisement of permanent expatriates seemed inevitable.5 
Nearly 40 years have passed without any such litigation. 
When UOCA VA replaced OCVRA in 1986, no one in Congress 
revoiced the constitutional objections. Millions of votes have been 
cast under OCVRA and UOCAVA in federal elections, including 
many by the subset of voters-permanent expatriates-whose 
inclusion in the law is so constitutionally problematic. There seems 
to be little prospect of anyone going to court now to challenge a law 
under which so many people have been enjoying the right to vote 
for so long. Politically, if not legally, UOCAVA is entrenched. 
Nevertheless, the law's constitutional problems remain.6 
First, UOCAVA flouts the Constitution's clear standards for voter 
eligibility in congressional elections. Second, UOCA VA is not an 
appropriate use of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment 
enforcement power, especially in light of recent Supreme Court 
rulings. Third, it causes problems with proper congressional 
apportionment. Fourth, UOCAVA sits in uneasy proximity to the 
continued disenfranchisement of U.S. citizens who live in 
Washington, D.C., and the territories. Indeed, citizens who move 
from a state to one of these places lose their right to vote in 
federal elections (other than for President in D.C.). 7 If U.S. 
5 See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text. 
6 The first and most comprehensive constitutional attack came soon after 
OCVRA passed, in a law review article by a staff assistant to Representative Charles 
Wiggins, the primary congressional opponent of the law. See generally David L. Shurtz, 
Comment, Eliminating State Bona Fide Residence Requirements: The Constitutional 
Question, 1 INT'L SCH. L. REV. 131 (1976). Alan Gura's attack on the law's 
constitutionality is also fairly broad and presses many of the same points as Part II of 
this article. See generally Alan Gura, Ex-Patriates and Patriots: A Constitutional 
Examination of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 6 TEX. REV. L. 
& POL. 179 (2001). Among others questioning UOCAVA's constitutionality are Romeu v. 
Cohen, 265 F.3d 118, 134 n.7 (2d Cir. 2001) (Walker, J., concurring) (stating that 
UOCA VA "appears constitutionally infirm"); District of Columbia House Voting Rights 
Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 1433 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 64 
(2007) [hereinafter Hearing on D.C. House Voting Rights Act] (statement of Jonathan 
Turley, Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School) ("UOCAVA has 
never been revieyved by the Supreme Court and some legitimate questions still remain 
about its constitutionality."); ROBERT W. BENNETT, TAMING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 177 
& 257 n.44 (2006) (saying that UOCAVA's constitutionality is "doubtful"); Robert W. 
Bennett, Popular Election of the President Without a Constitutional Amendment, 4 GREEN 
BAG 2d 241, 242 (2001) (stating that UOCAVA is "of dubious constitutionality''). 
7 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1. Residents of Washington, D.C., do get 
to vote for a nonvoting delegate to the House of Representatives, as do residents of 
American Samoa (who are U.S. nationals, but not U.S. citizens), Guam, the Northern 
Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. See Robert W. Bennett, 
Should Parents Be Given Extra Votes on Account of Their Children?: Toward A 
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citizens who leave the country permanently have voting rights 
that are so sacrosanct, it is odd that these other U.S. citizens, 
living on U.S. soil, do not.8 
OCVRA and UOCAVA's constitutional problems are not 
mere technicalities, and they should be fixed rather than ignored. 
This need for reform is particularly important because of the 
constitutional principles that UOCA VA breaches: limited federal 
power, federalism, and equality. But citizens' ability to vote is 
important, too. OCVRA enfranchised permanent expatriates as 
part of a larger, decades·long struggle to strengthen the core of 
American constitutional democracy-the spirit that animated 
OCVRA was a worthy and legitimate one. The proper response to 
UOCAVA's constitutional problems, and the one that this article 
ultimately seeks, is not to disenfranchise permanent expatriates, 
but rather to find a better, more constitutionally suitable way to 
enfranchise them. 
Only Congress can put permanent expatriates' voting 
rights on a sound constitutional footing, doing justice both to 
these citizens and to the Constitution. Part. I of this article 
provides some history and context on overseas voting. Part II 
argues that UOCAVA's enfranchisement of permanent 
expatriates9 is unconstitutional. Part III explores the reasons 
why that legal argument has never seen the inside of a 
courtroom-mainly that private plaintiffs have justiciability 
problems, and state plaintiffs are hemmed in by the political 
unpopularity of litigating to disenfranchise these voters. This 
absence of litigation has implications for lawmakers confronted 
with constitutionally questionable legislation in the future who 
might otherwise assume they can simply leave it to the courts 
to settle constitutional questions. 
Mindful of how entrenched UOCA VA is, Part IV concludes 
by considering some suggestions for reformulating UOCAVA to 
avoid constitutional problems while duly respecting permanent 
expatriates' voting rights. Although there are multiple options 
that would be effective if enacted, UOCAVA's entrenchment 
means that none of them would be easy to pass. The most 
Conversational Understanding of American Democracy, 94 Nw. L. REV. 503, 531 & 
nn.115, 118 (2000). Citizens who move to the Northern Mariana Islands do actually get 
to vote like those who leave the United States entirely. See infra note 243. 
8 This is the only aspect of UOCAVA's constitutionality that has been 
litigated, though not in a way that validated UOCAVA's enfranchisement of permanent 
expatriates. See infra Section II.B.4. 
9 UOCAVA also assists voters who are overseas only temporarily but 
maintain a bona fide stateside residence, making it easier for them to vote absentee; 
this article does not question the constitutionality of that part of the law. 
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plausible solution uses the opportunity for constitutional reform 
created by the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact 
(NPVIC). As its name suggests, the NPVIC would use a national 
popular vote to determine presidential elections, a prospect that 
could spur a useful dialogue about expanding "national" to include 
all citizens-not just permanent expatriates, but also residents of 
U.S. territories-without relying on UOCAVA's awkward and 
unconstitutional structure. 
I. THE CONTEXT OF FEDERAL OVERSEAS-VOTING LEGISLATION 
A. The Demographics of Overseas Voters 
Millions .of American citizens live abroad, though no one 
knows their precise number. 10 However many millions there are, 
though, only a few hundred thousand of them vote.l 1 The decennial 
census does not attempt to count most of those without a current 
stateside address, and such people usually are not included in the 
state population figures that are used for apportioning seats in 
the U.S. House and votes in the Electoral College.l2 
The federal government does keep track of the overseas 
population of military personnel and federal employees and their 
dependents (a group that this article will refer to as "public 
expatriates"). The 2010 Census counted over a million Americans 
working abroad for the military or the federal government or 
living with a family member who did.l3 They are included in the 
census, and thus in congressional apportionment, 14 even though 
many of them do not know when they will return to the United 
States or where they will live once they do. But the number of 
10 See FORS MARsH GROUP LLC, A MODEL FOR DEVELOPING ESTIMATES OF U.S. 
CITIZENS ABROAD 63 (2013), https://www.fvap.gov/uploads/FVAP/Reports!OCE_Technical_ 
Report.pdf [http:~/perma.cc/BV8J-W74Z) (using statistical model to estimate 2.6 million to 
7.8 million American citizens living abroad, with mean estimate of 4.3 million); AMANDA 
KLEKOWSKI VON KOPPENFELS, MIGRANTS OR ExPATRIATES?: AMERICANS IN EUROPE 183 
(2014) (noting estimates ranging from 2.2 million to 7.6 million). 
II Just over 600,000 ballots were cast by military and overseas voters in 2012. 
See U.S. ELECTION AsSISTANCE COMM'N, UNIFORMED AND OVERSEAS CITIZENS ABSENTEE 
VOTING ACT: SURVEY FINDINGS, JULY 2013, at 21 (2013}, http://www.eac.gov/assetsl 
1/Documents/508compliant_Main_91_p.pdf [http://perma.cc/NSH8-BVLH]. Only about 
46% of these ballots were cast by nonmilitary expatriates, and the military-voter numbers 
are not broken down between those stationed overseas versus domestically. See id. 
12 See KAREN CROOK & SHffiLEY DRUETTO, 2010 CENSUS FEDERALLY 
AFFILIATED OVERSEAS COUNT OPERATION ASSESSMENT REPORT 1, 5 (2012), 
https://www.census.gov/2010censuslpdf/2010_Census_Federally_Affiliated_Overseas_ 
Count_Operation_Assessment.pdf [http://perma.cc/66UA-WV5Q]; KLEKOWSKI VON 
KOPPENFELS, supra note 10, at 251 (discussing census's treatment of expatriates). 
13 See CROOK & DRUETTO, supra note 12, at 33. 
14 See KLEKOWSKI VON KOPPENFELS, supra note 10, at 251-52. 
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expatriates who are not connected with the military or federal 
government ("private expatriates") is probably larger.1s The 
Census Bureau has experimented with ways of counting private 
expatriates, without much success.l6 
A fundamental problem with counting overseas citizens 
is that there are many ways to classify them. Someone could 
qualify as being overseas on the census's counting day by virtue 
of having short-term employment in another country or a 
foreign vacation home, all while strongly maintaining a 
domicile in the states and paying both local and federal taxes. 
A more restrictive classification might include only those whose 
formal domicile is abroad and who pay only federal taxes; 17 
such citizens might intend to return to the United States but 
not know precisely where they will reside. 1s More restrictive 
still would be including only those citizens with a foreign 
domicile who intend never to return to the United States. The 
total number of "overseas citizens" varies greatly depending on 
the scope of the definition. 
This article is not concerned with citizens who maintain 
a domicile stateside and use UOCAVA simply to vote absentee. 
UOCAVA's constitutional problems arise from the latter two, 
more restrictive categories of U.S. citizens: voting-age 
Americans who are domiciled overseas indefinitely or 
permanently and have the right to vote in federal elections only 
because UOCAV A forces states to treat them as though they 
lived at their last U.S. address.l9 Such citizens are what this 
article means by "permanent expatriates." They are only a 
subset of the millions of U.S. citizens overseas, though again, 
how large a subset is not precisely known. 
Voting from overseas is more logistically complex than 
voting in person domestically. Even after the passage of 
15 See id. at 183 (indicating a total expatriate population of well over two million). 
1s See id. at 253. 
17 Unusually in the world, American federal income taxation is based on 
citizenship rather than residence. Americans overseas are thus subject to federal 
income tax or (in the case of those with no tax liability, often because of credit for 
foreign taxes paid) are at least required to file an annual return with the IRS. See id. at 
261-64. 
1s See Voting Rights for U.S. Citizens Residing Abroad: Hearings on H.R. 3211 
Before Subcomm. on Elections of the H. Comm. on H. Admin., 94th Cong. 186 (1975) 
[hereinafter House Hearings] (comments of Sargent Shriver, Chairman, Ambassadors 
Comm. for Voting by Americans Overseas) (noting existence of such people). 
19 See id. at 257 (testimony of Mary C. Lawton, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.) 
(conceding constitutionality of absentee-ballot provisions while challenging 
constitutionality of provisions requiring relaxed residency standards); H.R. REP. No. 
94-649, at 15 n.5 (1975) (minority views) (noting lack of constitutional objections by 
OCVRA's opponents with regard to general provisions on absentee voting). 
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OCVRA and UOCA VA, many overseas voters-particularly 
those not affiliated with the federal government...:_have tried to 
vote but failed, and many do not even try.zo Congress has paid a 
lot of attention to these difficulties and passed multiple pieces 
of legislation in its attempts to make it easier for these 
overseas citizens to vote successfully.21 Perhaps more 
significantly, the Internet holds tremendous potential for 
further improving overseas voting and makes it easy to 
imagine a day when interested voters overseas will be able to 
vote as easily as interested voters at home. 22 Increasing the 
number of overseas voters through the use of advanced 
technology would increase the practical impact of the issues 
identified by this article and would make UOCA VA's 
constitutional deficiencies harder to ignore. 
B. The History of Federal Overseas Voting Law 
Overseas voting has deep roots. Individual states 
instituted absentee voting for soldiers in the field during the 
Civil War, and even more states did so during World War 1.23 
When this proved fairly workable, civilian absentee voting 
followed by analogy. 24 
The federal government first stepped in during World War 
II. In 1942, Congress passed a law that guaranteed soldiers a vote 
in federal elections during wartime-even if they were overseas, 
had not yet registered, and had not paid their poll tax-so long as 
they were otherwise qualified to vote in their state.25 The law's 
mandatory nature was of questionable constitutionality (the 
2o See FED. VOTING AsSISTANCE PROGRAM, THE FEDERAL VOTING ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAM: FOURTEENTH REPORT 11 (1993), http://www.fvap.gov/uploads/FVAP/Reports/ 
14threport.pdf [http://perma.cc/L953-3K77]. · 
21 The two main updates since OCVRA and UOCAVA have been the Help 
America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666, and the Military and 
Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 575-589, 123 Stat. 
2190, 2318-35 (2009). For a list of others and a summary of these laws' provisions, see 
KEVIN J. COLEMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20764, THE UNIFORMED AND OVERSEAS 
CITIZENS ABSENTEE VOTING ACT: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES 2-6 (2015). Because of the 
difficulty in calculating the denominator-the voting-age overseas population-it is 
difficult to come up with any sort of precise participation figures. See FED. VOTING 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, 2012 POST-ELECTION REPORT TO CONGRESS 15, 60 (2013), 
http://www .fvap.gov/uploads/FV AP/Reports/20 12report. pdf [http://perma.cd AZ7 4-GQCS]. 
22 The MOVE Act requires states to establish procedures for electronic 
transmission of ballots, which is likely more reliable and definitely faster than mailing 
them from overseas. See 52 U.S.C.A. § 20302(a)(6) (West 2015). Actual online voting is 
still in the future. See COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 10 (describing initial efforts). 
23 See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 104, 150 (2000). 
24 See id. at 151. 
25 Act of Sept. 16, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-712, 56 Stat. 753. 
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major concern was federalism), but its validity was never tested. 
The states never actually obeyed the law; it was softened in 1944 
to make it optional for the states, and it expired with the end of 
the war in 1945.26 
In 1955, Congress expanded the law to apply in peacetime, 
to cover "civilian service" employees (like the Red Cross, merchant 
marines, and nonmilitary federal employees), and to include 
spouses and dependents.27 The law still only protected residents 
who were qualified to vote but were unable to do so because they 
were not physically present; it expanded access but not eligibility. 
Significantly, the 1955 law also only suggested that states 
enfranchise these voters and did not require it as the 1942 law 
had.2~> As a House committee report put it, the old law's 
compulsory character -raised constitutional questions that had not 
been resolved; by making the law optional, this problem would go 
away as the states regained "their historic privilege of 
determining certain voting qualifications."29 In 1955, Congress 
still took these constitutional issues seriously. 
Despite the law's optional character, every state soon 
provided a way for overseas soldiers to vote, and most states 
adopted the federal suggestion to include other public expatriates, 
such as soldiers' dependents and federal employees and their 
dependents.30 Most states, however, did not take it upon 
themselves to extend the courtesy to private expatriates.31 In 
response, Congress expanded the law again in 1968, suggesting to 
states that they cover those in the private sector who were 
26 See Act of Apr. 1, 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-277, 58 Stat. 136 (changing the 1942 
Jaw's mandatory procedures and forms to be merely recommendatory); R. Michael 
Alvarez et a!., Military Voting and the Law: Procedural and Technological Solutions to 
the Ballot Transit Problem 19-20 (Caltech/MIT Voting Tech. Project, Working Paper No. 
53, 2007), http://www. vote.caltech.edu/sites/defaultlfiles/vtp_wp53.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
6L6P-VDQX] (detailing the 1944 law's sensitivity to states' rights); DEP'T OF DEFENSE, 
THE FEDERAL VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: ELEVENTH REPORT 2 (1977), 
http://www.fvap.gov/uploads/FV AP/Reports/11 threport.pdf [http://perma.cc/LZ94-ZNY6] 
(describing law's lack of impact or effect). The law passed three weeks before the 1942 
election, so it was too late to have any effect. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 84-60, at 2 (1955) ("The 
constitutionality of this fiat was never tested .... "). 
27 Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-296, 69 Stat. 584. 
2R !d. § 101, 69 Stat. at 584 (''The Congress hereby expresses itself as 
favoring, and recommends that .... "). 
29 H.R. REP. No. 84-60, at 2; see Am. Political Sci. Ass'n Special Comm. On Serv. 
Voting, Findings and Recommendations of the Special Committee on Service Voting, 46 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 512, 522 (1952) (expressing eoncern about constitutional issues). 
"" See H.R. REP. No. 90-1385, at 2 (1968) ("Each State, Commonwealth, and 
Territory now provides for absentee voting by military personnel. ... Over one-half of 
the States have met all of the recommendations of the Congress in the 1955 statute."). 
31 See id. at 2-3 (noting state practices in response to the 1955 law). 
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overseas temporarily.32 Most states followed along in some 
manner, but there remained a large discrepancy between the 
treatment of governmental and nongovernmental workers.33 
At this point, there was little potential for constitutional 
controversy because Congress had stayed sensitive to the states' 
"historic privilege." But in 1975, Congress passed the Overseas 
Citizens Voting Rights Act (OCVRA),34 granting "[e]ach citizen 
residing outside of the United States" the right to vote in federal 
elections as if he still lived at his last American address, even if 
"his intent to return to such State or district may be 
uncertain."as The new statute thus explicitly included permanent 
expatriates and required (as opposed to suggested) that states 
allow them to vote in federal elections.36 
OCVRA altered the landscape dramatically. Prior to its 
enactment, Congress only sought to help residents votea7 when 
they were otherwise qualified but happened to be absent. OCVRA 
did expand such absentee voting significantly,as but it went far 
beyond this and actually changed the state-mandated 
qualifications for voting. Now, a nonresident of a state who was not 
otherwise qualified to vote could vote anyway because Congress 
forced the states to include anyone who "could have met all 
qualifications" had he or she not moved away.a9 In effect, 
Congress was making states treat these nonresidents as if they 
were still partial citizens.40 This was just about federal voting; 
Congress steered clear of granting a right to vote in state and 
local elections, in contrast to previous legislation, which did not 
make this distinction.4I 
32 Act of June 18, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-343, 82 Stat. 180. 
33 See House Hearings, supra note 18, at 276-80 (statement of J. Eugene 
Marans, Counsel, Bipartisan Comm. on Absentee Voting) (providing raw data on state 
treatment of public and private expatriates in 1975); H.R. REP. No. 94-649, at 3 (1975) 
(noting limited compliance with the 1968law's recommendations). 
34 Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-203, 89 Stat. 
1142 (1976). 
3s !d. §§ 3-4, 89 Stat. at 1142-43. 
. 36 !d. § 4, 89 Stat. at 1143 (requiring that "(e)ach State shall provide"). 
Congress made it a felony for a state official to violate these new voting rights. See id. 
§ 5, 89 Stat. at 1143. 
37 This article refers to voting without much discussion of registration, but it 
is worth mentioning that the right to register from abroad is separate from the right to 
vote from abroad, and OCVRA specifically protects both. Cf H.R. REP. No. 90-1385, at 
2-3 (1968) (noting how strict state registration requirements effectively disenfranchised 
expatriates in many states). 
38 Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act § 4, 89 Stat. at 1143. 
39 Id. § 3, 89 Stat. at 1142 (emphasis added). 
40 &e infra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing notion of "partial citizens"). 
41 Compare Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-296, § 101, 
69 Stat. 584, 584 (covering "any primary, special, or general election held in [the 
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The problems with this approach did not go unnoticed. 
While sympathetic to the goal of enfranchisement, the Department 
of Justice and several members of Congress opposed the bill on 
constitutional grounds.42 The leading opponent, Representative 
(later Judge) Charles Wiggins, tried unsuccessfully to limit the 
bill to presidential elections.43 Wiggins also tried to amend the bill 
in committee to include only those people still domiciled in a 
state, but that failed as well, by a 12 to 7 vote.44 The House 
Committee reviewing OCVRA approved it 14 to 5, with the 
minority objecting mainly on constitutional grounds.4s 
The law's proponents made their own constitutional 
arguments,46 but support for the law was rooted primarily in a 
widespread sentiment that constitutional disputes should be 
left to the courts to resolve-and that litigation was inevitable. 
As a key subcommittee chairman put it, "Would it not be better 
to pass the bill, if we think it is needed and desirable 
legislation, and let the question of its constitutionality rest 
where it properly does under our scheme of government here, 
in the hands of the Supreme Court?"47 Wiggins's reply ("We do 
have a duty, obviously.") was unavailing. 48 A motion to table 
Wiggins's attempt to limit OCVRA to presidential elections 
passed by a single vote moments after one subcommittee 
member announced his opposition to the motion because, as he 
put it, "I am not worried about the constitutionality because 
voter's] election district or precinct"), with Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act § 3, 89 
Stat. at 1142 (covering "any Federal election"). 
42 As Rep. Wiggins put it, "As a matter of policy I think we all support the 
maximum participation in the franchise but as a matter of constitutional law we may 
not be able to extend that franchise to U.S. citizens who are not residents of any State." 
121 CONG. REC. 39,733 (1975) (statement of Rep. Wiggins); see House Hearings, supra 
note 18, at 253-64 (testimony of Mary C. Lawton, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.); Voting 
By U.S. Citizens Residing Abroad: Hearings on S. 2102 and S. 2384 Before Subcomm. 
on Privileges and Elections of the S. Comm. on Rules and Admin., 93rd Cong. 58·65 
(1973) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (testimony of Mary C. Lawton, Deputy Assistant 
Att'y Gen.); H.R. REP. No. 94-649, at 13-19 (1975) (reporting dissenting views of Rep. 
Wiggins and three colleagues). 
43 See Pending Business, H. Comm. on H. Admin., 94th Cong. 19, 34 (Oct. 30, 
1975) (recording proposal and defeat of Wiggins amendment). 
44 Pending Business, H. Comm. on H. Admin., 94th Cong.ll-12, 21 (Nov. 4, 1975). 
45 H.R. REP. No. 94-649, at 13-19 (reporting minority views, including the 
sentiment that "Congress may not, consistent with the Constitution, extend the right to 
vote in all federal elections to U.S. citizens who are not residents of any stall!' (citation 
omitted)); Pending Business, supra note 44, at 39 (reporting final committee vote). 
46 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-649, at 5-7; S. REP. No. 94-121, at 5-7 (1975). 
47 Transcript of the Subcomm. on Elections of the H. Comm. Olt H. Admin., 
considering S. 95, 94th Cong. 55-56 (Oct. 8, 1975) [hereinafter Transcript on S. 95] 
(comments of Rep. Dent). 
48 ld. at 56. 
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the courts can decide."49 OCVRA's legislative history contains 
many other similar expressions of this willingness to defer to 
the seemingly inevitable process of judicial review.so Given the 
then-recent experience of the Voting Rights Act Amendments 
of 1970-enacted in June, challenged immediately in the 
Supreme Court in Oregon u. Mitchell, 51 and partially upheld in 
December 1970-this expectation of swift, certain court review 
was understandable. 
But despite the expectation that someone would quickly 
pick up these constitutional objections and file a lawsuit 
challenging the enfranchisement of permanent expatriates, no 
one ever has. OCVRA was updated by UOCAVA in 1986, but 
UOCAVA left these crucial features intact without any 
discussion of the constitutional problems.52 Subsequent updates 
to the law have done the same.s3 
A major element of UOCA VA's constitutional problem is 
its mandatory character, which conflicts with constitutional 
principles of federalism. Nevertheless, many states have been 
49 I d. at 66-67 (comments of Rep. Burton and discussion following). 
50 See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 18, at 262 (testimony of Mary C. 
Lawton, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.) (opposing OCVRA and calling it "a beautiful 
basis for litigation"); id. at 258 (comments of Rep. Dent) (responding to disagreement 
over constitutionality of OCVRA by saying that Congress "will have to leave it to the 
Supreme Court to determine if we have overstepped" (emphasis added)); Senate 
Hearings, supra note 42, at 59, 68 (comments of Sen. Pell) (suggesting President should 
sign the bill despite thinking it is unconstitutional, because "that should be settled in 
the courts quickly"); Transcript on S. 95, supra note 47, at 59 (comments of Rep. 
Mathis) (showing agreement in subcommittee· of proponents and opponents that 
OCVRA "is going to be tested in the courts"); 121 CONG. REC. 39,735 (1975) (statement 
of Rep. Danielson) (saying that despite his agreement with the constitutional 
objections, he supported the bill and would leave it to the courts); id. at 39,734 
(statement of Rep. Rhodes) (stating that constitutional concerns will "undoubtedly be 
taken care of in the courts"); id. (statement of Rep. Hays) (stating in floor debate that 
the bill should pass and that doubts about constitutionality-to which he admitted 
himself-should be left to the courts); see also Gura, supra note 6, at 191 (noting some 
of these quotations and discussing this congressional lack of interest in taking 
constitutionality seriously); cf. Am. Political Sci. Ass'n, supra note 29, at 522 
(recommending proceeding with constitutionally questionable overseas-voting 
legislation in the 1950s, given the likelihood of swift and decisive judicial review). One 
reason for this sentiment was that Congress had often pushed the bounds of what 
previous case law had suggested was appropriate and then eventually prevailed in 
court. The argument for caution therefore sounded to OCVRA's proponents like similar 
arguments against previous successful legislation. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra 
note 42, at 88 (statement of J. Kevin Murphy, Chairman, Bipartisan Comm. on 
Absentee Voting); Transcript on S. 95, supra note 47, at 65-66 (comments of Rep. 
Dent). 
51 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
52 See Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, Pub. L. No. 99-
410, 100 Stat. 924 (1986); see also H.R. REP. No. 99-765 (1986) (containing no 
discussion of constitutionality). 
53 See supra note 21. 
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more than receptive to the federal mandate and have 
enfranchised people that even UOCA VA does not require them to 
include. Several states allow at least some permanent expatriates 
to vote in state and local elections.54 Most states allow people who 
were born abroad (and thus have no "last U.S. address") to vote 
wherever their parents can, though some states only extend that 
right for federal elections. 55 
The willingness of such states to go above and beyond 
UOCAVA's requirements means that UOCAVA is not as 
unconstitutional as it could be; the states' actions might mitigate 
the constitutional problems that stem from the statute's coercive 
nature. That said, it is impossible to know what any of these 
states would have done, or would do in the future, if Congress had 
adopted an approach different from 'UOCAVA's. In any event, 
there is still plenty of unconstitutionality to go around, as the 
next part of this article will address. 
II. WHY UOCAVA IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
UOCAVA's enfranchisement of permanent expatriates is 
unconstitutional. Policy arguments (for example, that it is a good 
thing that permanent expatriates get to vote-and it is) are a 
"
4 For state-by-state information, see Voting Assistance Guide (VAG), FED. 
VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, http://www.fvap.gov/vao/vag (http://perma.cc/68Y9-
2VP8] (last visited Feb. 29, 2016) (state-by-state information on file with author). Each 
state's link indicates whether overseas voters can use the Federal Write-In Absentee 
Ballot (FWAB), a special UOCAVA ballot, to vote in state and local elections. Some 
explicitly preclude it (Arizona, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, South Dakota, and Wyoming). Some allow only public 
expatriates to do so (Maryland, Minnesota, New York, and Wisconsin) or only voters in 
certain elections (Iowa and Texas). The others indicate that the FWAB can be used for 
state and local elections, but without specifying whether only those who maintain a 
domicile in the state-thereby potentially exposing themselves to state-tax liability-
can do so. See id. ("If you claim a particular State as your residence and have other ties 
with that State in addition to voting, then you may be liable for State and local 
taxation, depending upon that particular State law. Consult your legal counsel for 
specific questions or situations."). Those states that allow general participation in state 
elections without restriction might be exhibiting sensitivity to the constitutional 
symmetry requirements that UOCA VA ignores rather than a desire to expand the 
franchise. See infra Section II.B.l. 
"" States only began allowing citizens born outside the United States to 
vote in the late 1990s, after encouragement from the federal government. See FED. 
VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, THE FEDERAL VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: THE 
SIXTEENTH REPORT 3 (200 1), http://www .fva p.gov/uploads!FV AP/Reports/16threport. pdf 
[http://perma.ccNXG6-NVRS] (describing changes in state laws resulting from federal 
initiatives); Never Resided in the U.S.?, FED. VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, 
http://www.fvap.gov/citizen-voter/reside [http://perma.cc/44BS-U85H] (last visited Feb. 
29, 2016) (providing current list of such states and specifying federal-only rights for 
some); see also UNIF. MILITARY & OVERSEAS VOTERS ACT § 2(1)(E) (2010) (providing for 
enfranchisement of such people). 
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matter for another day. 56 That does not mean, however, that the 
constitutional arguments are arguments only for courts and not 
legislators. In the absence of litigation, members of Congress 
should remember the example of 1955, respect their oaths to 
support the Constitution, and take action to put overseas-voting 
rights on a sturdier constitutional footing. 57 
The Constitution requires that voters in congressional 
elections be part of the populace of the states where they vote-
and it assumes that the states, not Congress, define their 
electorates. The Constitution accords similar power to the states 
to define their electorates for presidential elections. UOCA VA 
rests on Congress's assumption that it could override these 
provisions by using its Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 power to 
protect the rights of citizens to vote and travel and the right of 
private citizens to be treated the same as public employees. 
Supreme Court case law, however, reveals that this assumption is 
fatally flawed, especially in light of the lack of federal voting 
rights for U.S. citiz'ens who live in D.C. and the territories. 
A. Arguments from 1975 
When UOCAVA's predecessor, OCVRA, was considered 
in 1975, Congress was not willing to have a real constitutional 
debate-that is, a debate in which members would determine 
whether they thought the legislation was constitutional and, if 
it wasn't, would vote against it.58 Nevertheless, the legislative 
process still did an impressive job of identifying and presenting 
key constitutional points and counterpoints. In other words, 
the constitutional arguments all made it into the record but 
were not taken very seriously beyond that. 
1. The Case for OCVRA 
To properly situate the argument that it was 
unconstitutional for OCVRA to enfranchise permanent 
expatriates, it is first necessary to understand why the Act's main 
proponents thought that it was constitutional.59 Members of 
Congress who supported OCVRA were confident that enacting the 
56 Alan Gura, UOCAVA's foremost recent critic, has grounded his attack in 
policy grounds as well as legal ones. See Gura, supra note 6. 
57 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. 
58 See Gura, supra note 6, at 191. 
59 The principal expressions of the argument in favor of OCVRA's 
constitutionality are at H.R. REP. No. 94-649, at 5-7 (1975) and S. REP. No. 94-121, at 
5-7 (1975). 
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statute fell within their power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The source of their confidence was two Supreme 
Court decisions upholding previous congressional expansions of 
voting rights: Katzenbach v. Morgan,60 and Oregon v. Mitchell.s1 
Morgan dealt with a challenge to the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965. The Act provided that if someone had obtained a sixth-
grade education in Puerto Rico, no state could deny that person 
the right to vote on grounds of English illiteracy; yet New York 
required voters to be able to read and write in English.s2 This 
squarely presented the question of the extent of the states' 
power to determine voter eligibility versus the federal 
government's power to enforce Fourteenth Amendment rights 
(here, equal protection). The Court summed up the two 
authorities' relative powers as follows: 
Under the distribution of powers effected by the Constitution, the 
States establish qualifications for voting for state officers, and the 
qualifications established by the States for voting· for members of the 
most numerous branch of the state legislature also determine who 
may vote for United States Representatives and Senators. But, of 
course, the States have no power to grant or withhold the franchise on 
conditions that are forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment, or any 
other provision of the Constitution. 63 
That part of the landscape, at least, was not in dispute. The 
question was whether banning literacy tests was within 
Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5 
of which gives Congress the power to pass "appropriate 
legislation" to enforce Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
The sticking point in Morgan was that in an earlier 
decision, the Supreme Court had ruled that literacy tests did 
not, on their face, violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 54 But the 
Morgan Court ruled that it did not matter whether the Court 
itself thought that New York's literacy test violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment.65 Rather, the key question was a more 
deferential one: whether the Court could "perceive a basis upon 
6o Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
61 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
62 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 643-44. 
63 Id. at 647 (citations omitted). 
64 See Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959)_ 
65 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 649 (denying that the Court's task entailed 
determining whether New York's English literacy requirement violates the Equal 
Protection Clause). The Morgan Court could have ruled that the previous case, being a 
facial challenge, did not preclude a conclusion that New York's law violated the Equal 
Protection Clause as applied to literate-in-Spanish Puerto Ricans. Instead, however, 
the Court went further. 
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which Congress might predicate a judgment" that literacy tests 
like New York's violated the Fourteenth Amendment.66 
By extending this deference to Congress, the Court was 
freeing Congress to look beyond the case law. Congress could use 
its legislative tools to seek out and redress what it reasonably 
considered to be Fourteenth Amendment violations-and in the 
process, trump the states' power to define voter qualifications. 
(The Court later dialed back this deference.67) 
When Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act 
Amendments in June 1970, it capitalized on its newfound 
power to preempt state voter-eligibility standards.68 The new 
federal law lowered the voting age to 18 for both federal and 
state elections. It also expanded the ban on literacy tests, again 
for both federal and state elections. Finally, it forbade states 
from imposing lengthy residency requirements for voting-but 
only for presidential elections. Voters who moved would be 
eligible to vote for President as long as they arrived in their 
new state at least 30 days prior to the election; fewer than 30 
days and their previous state of residence would have to let 
them vote there.69 
By December, in Oregon v. Mitchell, the Supreme Court 
had approved all of these parts of the Voting Rights Act 
Amendments except for the lower voting age in state 
elections.70 Mitchell thus reinforced Congress's sense that it 
66 Id. at 656. To be more precise, the question was whether it was 
"appropriate legislation" to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, that is, 
under the McCulloch u. Maryland standard, whether [it] may be regarded as 
an enactment to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, whether it is "plainly 
adapted to that end' and whether it is not prohibited by but is consistent with 
'the letter and spirit of the constitution." 
Id. at 651. 
67 See infra Section II.B.2. 
68 As Archibald Cox explained Morgan's impact to a Senate committee 
considering the 1970 Amendments, "Congress, as well as the Court and perhaps even 
more than the Court, has the power to determine what the equal protection clause 
requires in a given situation." Amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearings 
on S. 818, S. 2456, S. 2507, and Title IV of S. 2029 Before the Subcomm. on 
Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 331-33 (1970) 
[hereinafter Hearings on Voting Rights Act of 1965 Amendments] (statement of 
Archibald Cox, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School). Interestingly, Cox also 
concluded that "requiring more than bona fide residence is an invidious classification," 
suggesting that Congress could slap down other eligibility requirements but not bona 
fide residence. Id. at 332. 
69 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.). 
70 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). This spurred Congress to quickly 
pass the Twenty-Sixth Amendment in March 1971, and the states to set a new speed 
record by ratifying the amendment by July 1. See infra note 193 and accompanying text. 
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had considerable power to tinker with state voter-eligibility 
laws, especially in federal elections. 
The Court's treatment of residency requirements in 
Mitchell was particularly heartening to advocates of strong 
congressional action to extend overseas-voting rights. Not only 
had the Court allowed Congress to overwrite states' residency 
requirements with a federal standard, it had approved 
Congress's decision to let some people (those moving within 30 
days of the election) vote in places where they no longer 
resided. Although Mitchell produced five separate opinions, 
none with majority support, the Court clearly took seriously 
the twin rights of citizens to "travel" (that is, to live in 
whichever state they wanted) and vote. 
Emboldened by the decisions in Morgan and Mitchell-
and not accounting for how much further OCVRA would go 
than the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970-0CVRA's 
proponents confidently asserted that Congress had the power 
to prescribe uniform federal standards for overseas citizens' 
eligibility to participate in federal elections. 71 Congress's power 
to vindicate overseas citizens' Fourteenth Amendment travel 
and voting rights, they said, was sufficient to allow it to 
legislate in what had previously been the states' domain_72 
These proponents of OCVRA also contended that, while states 
could legitimately limit participation in state and local 
elections to bona fide residents, permanent expatriates have a 
legitimate interest in the doings of the federal government, and 
their interest could not be vindicated if they were subject to 
residence requirements when voting in federal elections.73 
71 See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 45-46 (statement of Sen. 
Goldwater) (declaring, based on Mitchell, that Congress had authority to pass OCVRA, 
without noting differences between OCVRA and law approved in Mitchel[); id. at 8, 11 
(statement of Nathan Lewin, former Assistant Solicitor General and former Deputy 
Assistant Att'y Gen.) (characterizing the pro-OCVRA view of federal power as post-
Mitchell and post-Morgan); id. at 6 (statement of Sen. Mathias) ("[W]e have a very 
clear mandate in the Constitution to make proper regulations for election of Federal 
officials."); H.R. REP. No. 94-649, at 5-7 (1975) (providing committee's argument that 
OCVRA "would be upheld if subjected to constitutional challenge in the U.S. Supreme 
Court"); S. REP. No. 94-121, at 5-7 (1975) (same). 
72 See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 8-9 (statement of Nathan 
Lewin, former Assistant Solicitor General and former Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.); 
H.R. REP. No. 94-649, at 5-7; S. REP. No. 94-121, at 5-7. 
n See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 56 (memorandum of law from 
Sen. Goldwater) (noting expatriates' interest in federal affairs); id. at 8 (statement of 
Nathan Lewin, former Assistant Solicitor General and former Deputy Assistant Att'y 
Gen.) (distinguishing the legitimacy of the application of residency requirements to 
federal versus state elections); H.R. REP. No. 94-649, at 7; S. REP. No. 94-121, at 6-7; 
see also S. REP. No. 90-1025, at 6 (1968) (individual views of Sen. Curtis) (advocating, 
in consideration of 1968 overseas-voting law, separate treatment for federal versus 
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In addition, proponents decried the unequal treatment 
that private citizens abroad received compared to public 
expatriates. In part because previous federal legislation had 
encouraged them to do so, states had a relaxed attitude toward 
the residency status of public expatriates and allowed these 
expatriates to maintain residency without knowing when or 
where they would return to the United States. 74 OCVRA's 
proponents saw this as a violation of the private expatriates' 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights and thus as 
more fodder for preemptive federal action.75 
2. The Case Against OCVRA 
The main sections of OCVRA (standardizing overseas 
absentee registration and voting procedures and access to them) 
spurred no constitutional concerns and no significant opposition. 
Making it easier for qualified, interested voters to participate in 
elections was obviously appealing.76 More problematic was the 
idea that Congress had the power to supersede residency 
requirements and thereby force states to allow people who were 
unquestionably nonresidents to vote there. Part of the problem 
was that permanent expatriates, particularly those who were 
motivated by tax avoidance, were a less sympathetic group than 
people with temporary postings overseas.77 But the principal. 
reason for the opposition was the constitutional problems that 
this aspect of OCVRA represented. 
The opponents-principally Representative Wiggins and 
the Office of Legal Policy in the Department of Justice-asserted 
three mam constitutional arguments against OCVRA's 
local elections); Kenneth M. Davidson, Voting Rights of Americans Abroad, 18 BUFF. L. 
REV. 469, 483 (1969) (arguing that residence requirements are relevant only for state 
elections, given expatriates' ongoing interest in federal matters). 
74 See supra text accompanying notes 27-30. 
75 See Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 84 (statement of J. Kevin Murphy, 
Chairman, Bipartisan Comm. on Absentee Voting) (setting out equal protection 
argument); House Hearings, supra note 18, at 272 (statement of J. Eugene Marans, 
Counsel, Bipartisan Comm. on Absentee Voting) (complaining of discrimination against 
private expatriates); H.R. REP. No. 94-649, at 3; S. REP. No. 94-121, at 3. 
76 See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 59 (testimony of Mary C. Lawton, 
Deputy AssiStant Att'y Gen.); 121 CONG. REC. 39,733 (1975) (statement of Rep. Wiggins). 
77 House Hearings, supra note 18, at 18 (comments of Rep. Boggs) (expressing 
opposition to boosting voting rights for those who severed their state and local ties to 
avoid taxes); Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 59 (testimony of Mary C. Lawton, 
Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.) (noting relative lack of sympathy for permanent 
expatriates); cf 121 CONG. REC. 39,734 (1975) (statement of Rep. Hays) (dismissing 
those "who ha[ve) gone to live abroad permanently'' as unworthy of discussion given 
that they probably will not "even bother to send for a ballot"). 
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enfranchisement of permanent expatriates: voting in 
congressional elections is limited to people of the states, neither 
the rights to vote and travel nor equal protection trumped that 
fact, and Mitchell did not say otherwise. 
a. People of the States 
The first and foremost constitutional problem with 
OCVRA's enfranchisement of nonresidents comes from Article I, 
Section 2, Clause 1: 'The House of Representatives shall be 
composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of 
the several States .... "78 The Seventeenth Amendment offers a 
parallel standard for elections to the U.S. Senate: 'The Senate of 
the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each 
State, elected by the people thereof . ... "79 In other words, if 
someone wants to vote in a congressional election, that person 
must be part of a state's populace. People who have left the states 
with no intention to return do not qualify, so by enfranchising 
them, OCVRA violated this basic aspect of Congress's 
constitutional composition.so 
There are plenty of places where the text of the 
Constitution is hopelessly vague (e.g., "necessary and proper'' and 
"due process"), but the "People of the States" Clauses are not 
among them. These clauses thus constitute, as UOCAVA critic 
Alan Gura would later put it, "the greatest obstacle to the Act's 
constitutionality."81 Although the clauses' meaning has not been 
litigated in the context of OCVRA and UOCAVA, the clauses 
account for the lack of any voting representatives in Congress for 
D.C. and the territories, the citizens of which do not live in 
78 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
79 Id. amend. XVII (emphasis added). 
so House Hearings, supra note 18, at 257 (testimony of Mary C. Lawton, 
Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.); H.R. REP. No. 94-649, at 14-15 (minority views); 
Transcript on S. 95, supra note 4 7, at 49-53 (comments of Rep. Wiggins); Shurtz, supra 
note 6, at 136-39. It is worth noting that UOCAVA could be read as merely changing 
the burden of proof and not actually enfranchising permanent expatriates. Because it 
states that people get to vote at their former residences even if their "intent to return 
[there] may be uncertain," perhaps UOCAVA only means to enfranchise people who 
intend to return to the United States someday, and simply puts the burden on the state 
to prove with sufficient certainty that they will never come back. If that were the case 
(and assuming for the sake of argument that the right to travel requires that 
expatriates who intend to return be allowed to vote), UOCAVA would be more likely to 
be congruent and proportional. But that is not how UOCAVA has been interpreted or 
applied. People with no intention of ever returning to the United States, let alone to 
their old districts, are given the power to vote in their old home's district anyway. It is 
not that temporary expatriates no longer have to prove that they are coming back, it is 
that permanent expatriates no longer have to worry that they are never coming back. 
81 Gura, supra note 6, at 200. 
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states.s2 Congress knew when it passed OCVRA that residents of 
D.C. and the territories could not vote in congressional elections.83 
But if people who live in the United States (just not in states) 
have no inalienable constitutional right to vote in congressional 
elections, then a fortiori people who do not live in the United 
States at all (let alone in a state) have no inalienable 
constitutional right to vote in congressional elections. 
To the extent that they engaged the issue, OCVRA's 
proponents had two main counterarguments. One was that the 
People of the States Clauses were inapplicable. The other was 
that Congress could declare that these permanent expatriates 
were citizens of their (former) states.s4 
The first argument-that Congress may simply ignore 
these constitutional provisions-is not really an argument. 
Nevertheless, it was made. In its report on OCVRA, the 
Committee on House Administration rejected the "people of the 
states" objection. 
[T]he Committee is persuaded that the Constitutional provtswns 
regarding election of Senators and Representatives discussed above 
are not sufficient to prevent Congress from protecting a person who 
exercises his Constitutional right to enjoy freedom of movement to 
and from the United States, when Congress may protect this right 
from other less fundamental disabilities. As Justice Stewart said in 
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 292, "The power of the States with 
regard to the franchise is subject to the power of the Federal 
Government to vindicate the unconditional personal rights secured 
to the citizen by the Federal Constitution."85 
In other words, the committee felt that the rights to travel 
abroad and vote were so weighty (so "unconditional") that 
Congress had the power to simply stand atop the Constitution's 
requirements for voting and extend the franchise further. 
The committee's purported support for this argument-
that Congress can protect the right to travel abroad from less 
82 See Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Alexander 
v. Mineta, 531 U.S. 940 (2000); Hearing on D. C. House Voting Rights Act, supra note 6, 
at 6 (statement of Rep. Smith) ("Since D.C. is not a State, it cannot have a voting 
Member in the House. That is not even a tough law school exam question."). 
83 See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 58, 90 (comments by Sen. Pell) 
(noting that OCVRA did not extend voting rights to U.S. citizens in the territories). 
84 A third response was based on the theory of federal power over congressional 
elections espoused by Justice Black in Oregon v. Mitchell and dismissed below. See infra 
notes 161-165 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 58, 90; 
Transcript of Executive Meeting, S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., considering S. 2102, 93rd 
Cong. 32·33 (June 4, 1974) (comments of James H. Duffy, Chief Counsel, Subcomm. on 
Privileges and Elections of the S. Comm. on Rules and Admin.). 
85 H.R. REP. No. 94·649, at 7. 
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fundamental disabilities-is a non sequitur. Indeed, it is 
unclear what the committee even meant. The phrasing was 
lifted from Justice Stewart's concurring/dissenting opinion in 
Mitchell that the committee quoted in the next sentence. In it, 
Justice Stewart wrote approvingly of the constitutionality of 
the federal statute that struck down states' excessive length-of-
residency requirements for voting in presidential elections. He 
wrote the following passage, which the committee report copied 
for its defense of OCVRA: 
Although the matter is not entirely free from doubt, I am persuaded 
that the constitutional provisions discussed above [concerning 
qualifications for voting in congressional and presidential elections] 
are not sufficient to prevent Congress from protecting a person who 
exercises his constitutional right to enter and abide in any State in the 
Union from losing his opportunity to vote, when Congress may protect 
the right of interstate travel from other less fundamental disabilities. 
The power of the States with regard to the franchise is subject to the 
power of the Federal Government to vindicate the unconditional 
personal rights secured to the citizen by the Federal Constitution.B6 
It is unclear what Justice Stewart meant when he said that 
Congress could protect the right to travel from "other less 
fundamental disabilities."87 Moreover, the context in Mitchell 
differed from OCVRA's in many important ways. Justice Stewart 
was writing about allowing interstate travelers to vote in their 
former homes for a 30-day transition period in presidential 
elections, whereas OCVRA went much further and gave 
permanent expatriates the permanent right to vote in their 
former homes in presidential and congressional elections. Despite 
these dissimilarities, the House committee did remarkably little 
paraphrasing here-a notable exception being its excision of 
Justice Stewart's caveat about the existence of doubt. 
While the extent of Congress's power to enforce the right 
to travel is certainly relevant in any constitutional analysis of 
OCVRA,88 it was quite a stretch to conclude that Congress's power 
extended so far that it could simply ignore constitutional bedrock 
86 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 292 (1970) (opinion of Stewart, J.). 
87 The only such congressional action that Justice Stewart mentioned came up 
when he cited United States u. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), in the middle of a string 
citation earlier in his opinion. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 285 (opinion of Stewart, J.). In Guest, 
the Supreme Court considered an indictment charging the defendants with, among other 
offenses, conspiring through violent intimidation "to injure, oppress, threaten, and 
intimidate" black citizens exercising their right to interstate (not international) travel. 
Guest, 383 U.S. at 747 & n.l. Perhaps one can debate whether murderous segregationists 
disable the right to travel more or less fundamentally than states imposing residency 
requirements, but in neither case does it justify the committee's conclusion. 
88 See infra notes 115·125 and accompanying text. 
460 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:2 
such as the Constitution's establishment of state-based 
representation in Congress. Though there may be space at the 
margins for minor modifications to state-based representation, 
that is a far cry from saying that the constitutional provision of 
state-based representation can simply be disregarded whenever it 
impinges on congressional power or constitutional rights.89 If the 
Constitution says in one place that Congress can do X, and in 
another that Congress cannot do Y, and X and Y overlap, then 
there may be legitimate questions of balancing and line drawing. 
But the People of the States Clauses do not limit congressional 
power in that manner. Rather, they speak at a much more 
fundamental level to what Congress actually is-how it is 
constituted and which people its members represent. For 
Congress to assert that its powers are so vast that it need not pay 
any heed to such clauses is rather unseemly. 
The second argument that the People of the States 
Clauses presented no constitutional problem contended that 
Congress could simply make permanent expatriates "people of 
[their former] states" by decree. As the House committee put it, 
The Committee believes that a U.S. citizen residing outside the 
United States can remain a citizen of his last State of residence and 
domicile for purposes of voting in Federal elections under this bill, as 
long as he has not become a citizen of another State and has not 
otherwise relinquished his citizenship in such prior State.90 
In other words, the committee believed that OCVRA could alter 
the bounds of state citizenship and define nonresidents as "partial 
citizens" for the limited purpose of federal voting. As citizens of 
the old state, these people would thus be "people of the state." 
This view at least acknowledges the People of the States Clauses. 
It also draws some support, albeit superficial, from the Supreme 
Court's decision in Mitchell.91 But it stretches the definition of 
citizenship-and federal power to define it-too far. 
s9 If this were not the case, then the analogous fact that Article I, Section 3 
mandates that Wyoming and 66-times-larger California both have two U.S. senators 
would have been struck down a long time ago as a violation of equal protection, 
contrary to Reynolds u. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). See STATE RANKINGS 2014: A 
STATISTICAL VIEW OF AMERICA 450 (Kathleen O'Leary Morgan & Scott Morgan eds., 
2014) (listing state populations). 
oo H.R. REP. No. 94-649, at 7; see also House Hearings, supra note 18, at 87 
(comments of J. Eugene Marans, Counsel, Bipartisan Comm. on Absentee Voting) 
(expressing idea that OCVRA would provide "a fraction domicile" that existed "solely 
for voting purposes"). · 
9 1 Mitchell approved the practice of letting people who move within 30 days of 
a presidential election vote in their former states, despite no longer being full citizens 
there. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 118-19. 
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Consider the other aspects of state citizenship, which 
Congress left out of permanent expatriates' partial citizenship.92 
These semicitizens cannot serve on juries. They do not pay sta'te 
or local taxes (Congress made sure of that).93 They cannot run for 
office. In sum, they are not part of the local civil society, other 
than indirectly through their ability to vote.94 
There are, of course, other citizens with limited rights of 
civic participation, most notably children, felons, and the 
mentally incompetent. But their status is different than that of 
permanent expatriates. Children, felons, and the mentally 
incompetent are citizens who do not qualify for one or more of 
the aspects of full civic participation. For them, citizenship is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for full participation. If 
they can do some things but not others (say, vote but not serve 
on a jury95), it is not because they are partial citizens but 
because they are full citizens with restricted rights. 
Permanent expatriates under OCVRA, by contrast, 
represent the opposite. Congress did not purport to make 
permanent expatriates full citizens and then leave it to the 
states to exclude them from jury duty. These expatriates were 
citizens only because of-and only to the extent of-their 
congressionally granted right to vote. For them, citizenship is a 
sufficient condition for participation. Congress's innovation is 
thus nothing more than a bootstrap. By deeming as citizens 
those who it wanted to be eligible to vote, but deeming them to 
be citizens only for voting purposes, Congress stripped the 
notion of citizenship of any meaning. It is as if Congress, in an 
effort to extend the franchise but not any other rights of 
adulthood to 16-year-olds, declared that legally, 16-year-olds 
were 18-year-olds, but only for the purpose ~f voting. This 
92 Cf 121 CONG. REC. 39,733 (1975) (statement of Rep. Wiggins) ("A person is a 
citizen of a State, according to the 14th amendment, if he resides therein. Such status 
extends to a person residing in such States a whole panoply of rights and responsibilities.'). 
93 See Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act of 1975 Amendment, Pub. L. No. 95-
593, § 5, 92 Stat. 2535, 2537 (1978) (clarifying that the exercise of federal voting rights 
under OCVRA cannot be used to establish liability for state taxes); 121 CONG. REC. 1259 
(1975) (statement of Rep. Frenzel) (announcing that OCVRA was not supposed to "affect 
in any way a citizen's determination of residence for the purpose of any tax''). 
94 In the analogous case of diversity jurisdiction, U.S. citizens who are 
domiciled abroad are not considered citizens of any state. Diversity jurisdiction opens 
federal courts to lawsuits between "citizens of different states" and between the 
citizens of a state and "foreign states, citizens or subjects." Because U.S. citizens 
domiciled abroad are not citizens of a state, they are not subject to the federal courts' 
diversity jurisdiction either as plaintiffs or defendants. 13E CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT' ET' 
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE§ 3621 (3d ed. 2009). 
95 See Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. 
REV. 65, 188-89 (2003) (noting commonness of this particular juxtaposition). 
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would be troublesome enough for any state to do itself, but for 
Congress to impose this formula on the states was an even 
greater constitutional transgression. 
b. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Congress cannot simply ignore the People of the States 
Clauses or bootstrap a solution to them. OCVRA's proponents 
were right, though, that Congress does have substantial power 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect citizens' 
rights. This power exists notwithstanding the Constitution 
initially assigning to the states the power to determine voter 
qualifications in congressional elections; it is why a pure 
federalism argument against OCVRA is unavailing.96 
There is no question that when OCVRA enfranchised 
permanent expatriates, it enhanced their right to vote, their right 
to live where they pleased, and their right to equal protection. But 
Congress's power is not defined this way. Section 5 gives Congress 
the power to respond to violations of Fourteenth Amendment 
rights, not the power to legislate generally in whatever ways 
might promote Fourteenth Amendment values. The question is 
thus whether a state's decision to exclude certain nonresidents 
from voting in federal elections would violate those citizens' equal 
protection rights or their rights to vote or travel. 
The version of OCVRA that first passed the Senate 
asserted as much. It contained the following findings of 
constitutional violations related to the status quo regarding 
overseas voting: 
The Congress ... finds that the foregoing conditions-
(1) deny or abridge the inherent constitutional right of citizens 
to vote in Federal elections; 
(2) deny or abridge the inherent constitutional right of citizens 
to enjoy their free movement to and from the United States; 
(3) deny or abridge the privileges and immunities guaranteed 
under the Constitution to citizens of the United States and to 
the citizens of each State; 
96 C{. H.R. REP. No. 94-649, at 13 (1975) (minority views) (describing OCVRA 
as "a quantum jump in the exercise of federal power"); Gura, supra note 6, at 202·04 
(making federalism/commandeering argument against UOCAVA, but neglecting to 
consider Section 5). 
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97 
(5) have the effect of denying to citizens the equality of civil 
rights and due process and equal protection of the laws that are 
guaranteed to them under the fourteenth amendment to the 
Constitution; and 
(6) do not bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling State 
interest in the conduct of Federal elections.98 
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These six findings (which were largely copied from the 
findings in the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 that 
were approved in Oregon v. Mitchell99) were apparently placed 
in the bill to make it easier for a reviewing court to find that 
Congress had acted properly. 100 In the House, though, OCVRA 
opponent Charles Wiggins successfully pushed to remove the 
findings from the bill. 101 But findings or no findings, OCVRA's 
proponents made it clear that they thought that the states' 
treatment of overseas voters violated the Constitution.102 
The proponents were on stronger ground to the extent 
that they were concerned about some states' extremely 
conservative standards for absentee voting for bona fide state 
residents who were temporarily abroad; there is little question 
that Congress can dictate the procedure and mechanics of 
congressional elections. 103 But even the proponents themselves 
recognized that their case was much weaker when it came to 
enfranchising permanent expatriates. 104 
97 The fourth finding, about "denying citizens the right to vote in Federal 
elections because of the method in which they may vote," was not controversial and did 
not feature significantly in debate over the bill. S. 95, 94th Cong. § 2(b) (as passed by 
the Senate, May 15, 1975); see supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
98 S. 95, 94th Cong. § 2(b) (as passed by the Senate, May 15, 1975). 
99 See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 313 (1970) (opinion of Harlan, J.) (quoting 
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 201, 84 Stat. 314, 316). 
1oo See House Hearings, supra note 18, at 92-94 (comments of J. Eugene 
Marans, Counsel, Bipartisan Comm. on Absentee Voting). 
101 See id. at 16, 92-94 (comments of Rep. Wiggins) (suggesting removal of 
findings); Pending Business, supra note 43, at 14 (comments of Rep. Wiggins) (noting 
removal of findings by subcommittee). 
102 The constitutional arguments in the main House report, H.R. REP. No. 94-
649, at 5-7 (1975), essentially tracked the findings in the Senate bill. 
103 See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013) 
(recognizing Congress's comprehensive authority to regulate congressional election 
procedures); see also supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing OCVRA 
opponents' lack of objections to this part of the law). 
104 The most striking such statement came from Senator Goldwater, who was 
one of the prime movers behind the expansion of voting rights abroad. Senate Hearings, 
supra note 42, at 48 ("Where I am uncertain about bumping into the Constitution is 
compelling a State to allow persons to vote who never intend to return."). 
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1. The Right to Vote 
The Senate's first finding, regarding the "inherent 
constitutional right of citizens to vote in Federal elections," was a 
considerable overstatement. 105 While OCVRA's proponents were 
able to point in Supreme Court opinions to plenty of dicta that 
spoke of this right to vote in general terms,106 they missed the 
point that the Constitution makes voting in congressional 
elections a matter of place, not just a matter of citizenship.107 The 
right to vote in federal elections is undoubtedly a sort of privilege 
of national citizenship,10s but voting in a particular state is not.109 
Representative Wiggins argued that if Congress had the power to 
pass OCVRA under these terms, it would also have the power to 
force California to let Floridians vote there-something that 
Congress should not be able to do either as a matter of policy or 
constitutional law.110 Article I and the Seventeenth Amendment 
make federal voting a matter of state residence.111 
Moreover, if the right to vote in federal elections were so 
inherent, that right would be violated when U.S. citizens living in 
D.C. or the territories are precluded from voting in congressional 
elections. While some proponents of OCVRA did acknowledge-
and express an interest in enfranchising-U.S. citizens in D.C. 
and the territories, they did not contend that the status quo in 
D.C. and the territories was unconstitutional.112 Indeed, if it were, 
the problem would have been solvable through litigation rather 
1os See House Hearings, supra note 18, at 256, 259 (testimony of Mary C. 
Lawton, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.) (criticizing notion of an "inherent constitutional 
right to vote in Federal elections"); see also Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 2 
(statement of Sen. Pell) ("Essentially, these bills state that citizens, wherever situated 
have an inherent constitutional right to vote, and that such a right should not be 
denied simply because those citizens cannot claim a residence in any State."). 
tos See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 52 (memorandum of law from 
Sen. Goldwater) (citing deceptively broad-sounding Supreme Court language about the 
right to vote, from cases holding that § 1983 applied to voting rights). 
101 See id. at 62 (testimony of Mary C. Lawton, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.); 
H.R. REP. No. 94-649, at 15 (minority views). 
1os See H.R. REP. No. 94-649, at 15 (minority views) (conceding this point). 
This right is obviously weak enough that U.S. citizens living in the territories do not 
enjoy it. But in the states, the Constitution guarantees a republican form of 
government, see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, and extends this broad franchise to federal 
elections, see id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; id. amend. XVII. 
108 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-649, at 15 (minority views); Shurtz, supra note 6, at 143. 
11o H.R. REP. No. 94-649, at 13-14 (minority views). 
111 See supra Section II.A.2.a; infra text accompanying notes 150-152; cf. U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (penalizing states for disenfranchising their "inhabitants"). 
112 See, e.g., Senate He,arings, supra note 42, at 58, 90 (comments of Sen. Pell). But 
see id. at 5 (statement of Sen. Mathias) (expressing desire to vindicate the constitutional 
right to vote of "every American citizen" through OCVRA-with no apparent consciousness 
of the similar, unaddressed plight of those in D.C. and the territories). 
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than legislation.na In fact, though, such litigation has been 
unsuccessful because courts have recognized that the voters' need 
in congressional elections to be "people of the states" trumps any 
inherent right of citizens to vote. 114 
ii. The Right to Travel 
Moving on to the Senate's second finding, excluding 
permanent expatriates also does not violate any "inherent 
constitutional right of citizens to enjoy their free movement to and 
from the United States."115 The right to travel protected by OCVRA 
is different in many ways from the right to travel protected by 
earlier doctrine. Most of the legal authority regarding the right to 
travel deals with the right to move interstate within the United 
States.116 To the extent that the law recognizes a right to leave the 
United States entirely, it sees that right as being significantly 
weaker; OCVRA's proponents incorrectly viewed the two rights as 
equal. 117 Also, the right to travel within the United States was 
generally couched as preventing states from discriminating 
113 See House Hearings, supra note 18, at 93 (comments of Rep. Wiggins) ("If it 
is a denial, all we need is a lawsuit which will declare whether he has a constitutional 
right or not."). 
114 See, e.g., Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C.), affd sub nom. 
Alexander v. Mineta, 531 U.S. 940 (2000) (rejecting attempt by D.C. residents to 
establish congressional voting rights). · 
115 The travel argument is presented in more detail in Senate Hearings, supra 
note 42, at 9, 53 (memorandum of law from Sen. Goldwater). 
116 See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999) (noting three components of 
right to travel, including "the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another 
State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when 
temporarily present in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to become 
permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State"). 
117 In the House report accompanying OCVRA, the committee wrote that 
American citizens have "the same right to international travel and settlement as ... [they 
have] to interstate travel and settlement." H.R. REP. No. 94-649, at 5 (1975); see also 
House Hearings, supra note 18, at 88-89 (comments of J. Eugene Marans, Counsel, 
Bipartisan Comm. on Absentee Voting); Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 10 (statement 
of Nathan Lewin, former Assistant Solicitor General and former Deputy Assistant Att'y 
Gen.). This was not true then. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642-43, 643 n.1 
(1969) (Stewart, J., concurring) (contrasting the powerful right to interstate travel with 
"mere conditionallibert[ies]" like international travel that are "subject to regulation and 
control under conventional due process or equal protection standards"); Senate Hearings, 
supra note 42, at 63 (testimony of Mary C. Lawton, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.) (citing 
authority for notion that right to travel abroad "is seemingly not as absolute as the right 
of interstate travel"). It certainly is not true now. See Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 
170, 176-77 (1978) (quoting Shapiro, supra, and stating that the "Court has often pointed 
out the crucial difference between the freedom to travel internationally and the right of 
interstate travel," namely that the former is "virtually unqualified," while the latter is 
not); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306 (1981) (''The Court has made it plain that the 
freedom to travel outside the United States must be distinguished from the right to travel 
within the United States." (emphasis omitted)). 
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against new arrivals, not as preventing the migrants' former 
states from recognizing their departures. 118 
Viewed in this light, OCVRA's opponents' argument is 
persuasive: it is an expatriate's own decision to change his 
formal domicile, not the decision to travel, that cost him the 
ability to vote before OCVRA.119 Overseas voters complained 
that maintaining their stateside domicile subjected them to 
state and local taxation;120 OCVRA and subsequent 
amendments eliminated that burden. 121 But the right to travel 
does not give citizens an unconditional right to emigrate 
without cost or consequence. 122 
Even when courts have held that the right to travel 
restricts state action, they have reaffirmed the states' ability to 
impose bona fide residency requirements. The most striking 
example is Dunn v. Blumstein, in which the Supreme Court 
struck down a Tennessee statute that required citizens to live 
in the state for a year in order to be eligible to vote. 123 The 
Court applied strict scrutiny to this requirement because it 
impinged on citizens' right to travel interstate. 124 In doing so, 
however, the Court took great pains to insulate bona fide 
residency requirements from such strictness. 
We emphasize again the difference between bona fide residence 
requirements and durational residence requirements. We have in the 
past noted approvingly that the States have the power to require that 
voters be bona fide residents of the relevant political subdivision. An 
appropriately defined and uniformly applied requirement of bona fide 
residence may be necessary to preserve the basic conception of a 
political community, and therefore could withstand close 
constitutional scrutiny.125 
11s See Shurtz, supra note 6, at 144; 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law§ 690 (2015). 
119 See H.R. REP. No. 94-649, at 16 (minority views) (making this argument). 
120 See Representation of the District of Columbia in the Congress: Hearings on 
H.J. Res. 280 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 109 (1975) [hereinafter Hearings on Representation of the 
District of Columbia] (comments of Rep. Drinan); House Hearings, supra note 18, at 
105 (comments of William C. Whyte, Vice President, United States Steel Corp.). 
121 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
122 Some proponents of OCVRA went even further and contended that 
requiring expatriates to maintain a domicile-and thus the expense of a home-in the 
United States in order to vote amounted to an illegal poll tax. See, e.g., Senate 
Hearings, supra note 42, at 67 (testimony of Sargent Shriver, Chairman, Ambassadors 
Comm. for Voting by Americans Overseas). This is incorrect. See Gura, supra note 6, at 
191 (dismantling this argument). · 
12a Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
124 Id. at 341-43. 
125 Id. at 343-44 (citations and footnotes omitted); see also Holt Civic Club v. 
Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 68-69 (1978) (citing long line of cases that "have uniformly 
recognized that a government unit may legitimately restrict the right to participate in its 
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In sum, whatever else the right to travel interstate may do, the 
right to travel abroad cannot trump bona fide residency 
requirements and cannot rewrite the People of the States Clauses. 
The Senate's third finding, regarding privileges and 
immunities, was added without any clear notion of what it was 
supposed to mean. Perhaps it was included because Justice 
Douglas had relied on the Privileges or Immunities Clause in 
his Oregon v. Mitchell opinion, and the Senate wanted to court 
Justice Douglas's vote (and anyone else's who might agree with 
him) and had nothing to lose by including this finding. 126 But 
regardless of whether the proper place to situate the rights to 
vote and travel is the Privileges or Immunities Clause or the 
Due Process Clause (mentioned in the Senate's fifth finding), 
the same problems described above remain. 
iii. Equal Protection 
In addition to due process, the Senate's fifth finding 
mentioned equal protection. This was the strongest argument 
supporting Congress's power to pass OCVRA, even if it was not 
always the main argument pressed by proponents. 127 The 
primary contention here was that private citizens abroad were 
subject to restrictive state registration and voting standards, 
while states gave considerably more leeway to members of the 
military, other federal employees, and their dependents. 128 
political processes to those who reside within its borders"); Hardy v. Lomenzo, 349 F. 
Supp. 617, 620-21 (1972) (deciding, in pre-OCVRA case, that a New Yorker who relocated 
to New Zealand had no right to vote absentee, because the Constitution does not preclude 
states from enforcing bona fide residence requirements); srtpra note 68 (noting Archibald 
Cox's implication that bona fide residence requirements are acceptable). 
126 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 149-50 (1970) (opinion of Douglas, J.); cf 
Hortse Hearings, srtpra note 18, at 256 (testimony of Mary C. Lawton, Deputy Assistant 
Att'y Gen.) (discussing privileges and immunities finding). 
127 See, e.g., Hortse Hearings, supra note 18, at 272 (statement of J. Eugene 
Marans, Counsel, Bipartisan Comm. on Absentee Voting); Senate Hearings, srtpra note 
42, at 84 (statement of J. Kevin Murphy, Chairman, Bipartisan Comm. on Absentee 
Voting); id. at 12-13 (statement of Nathan Lewin, former Assistant Solicitor General 
and former Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.); 121 CONG. REC. 1259 (1975) (statement of 
Rep. Frenzel); see also House Hearings, srtpra, at 259 (testimony of Mary C. Lawton, 
Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.) (conceding that differential treatment of public and 
private expatriates is "probably an equal protection problem"). Credit for the equal 
protection argument should extend to Davidson, supra note 73. 
128 See Senate Hearings, srtpra note 42, at 55 (memorandum of law from Sen. 
Goldwater); H.R. REP. No. 94-649, at 2-3 (1975). A separate equal protection argument 
was based on the fact that wealthy people living abroad were able to afford the expense 
of maintaining a stateside domicile-both the expense of owning and maintaining 
property and the expense of paying state and local taxes on it-while middle-class 
people were not. Senate Hearings, srtpra note 42, at 4 7 (statement of Sen. Goldwater). 
This was not really pressed as an equal protection violation per se, probably because 
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OCVRA's proponents correctly noted that this was 
discrimination and that it was intentional. (Of course, the roots of 
this preferential treatment were in previous federal legislation, 
which had encouraged states to treat federal employees this way, 
but Congress had since updated its recommendations to include 
private citizens abroad, and many states had just. declined to 
follow along.129) The rights to vote and travel are inherently 
limited by the People of the States Clauses and the states' 
corresponding power to enact bona fide residence requirementspo 
but the right of private expatriates to be treated the same as 
public expatriates is not. To the extent that a state lets public 
expatriates vote, private expatriates can claim an entitlement to 
equal treatment. 
Representative Wiggins argued that the Equal 
Protection Clause was inapplicable because on its face it only 
restricts a state from "deny[ing] to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."131 Wiggins argued 
that someone who is, by definition, both a nonresident of the 
state and physically located outside of its borders is not within 
the state's jurisdiction and so is not protected by the Equal 
Protection Clause. 132 This reasoning is questionable. The 
Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase "within its 
jurisdiction" as applying the Fourteenth Amendment "to all 
within a State's boundaries, and to all upon whom the State 
would impose the obligations of its laws."133 While someone 
lacking minimum contacts with a state would seem unlikely to 
meet even this liberal standard, 134 a former resident who is 
trying to vote in a state and is being turned away is seemingly 
one upon whom the state is "imposing the obligations of its 
laws" (here, its residency requirement for voting). Moreover, to 
the extent that the state is allowing some expatriates to vote-
this was a matter of disparate impact rather than overt discrimination, and because 
wealth is not a suspect classification for equal protection purposes. 
129 See supra text accompanying notes 27-33. 
130 See Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 64 (testimony of Mary C. Lawton, 
Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.) (noting states' clear constitutional authority to maintain 
bona fide residence requirements); supra text accompanying notes 123-125. 
131 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1 (emphasis added). 
132 H.R. REP. No. 94-649, at 15 (minority views). Note that even under this 
view, states would be unable to discriminate in voting among those outside the 
jurisdiction on the basis of race (see U.S. CONST. amend XV) or sex (see id. amend XIX), 
or to do anything else that would not pass rational basis scrutiny. 
133 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 214 (1982). 
134 See Duffy ex rel. Duffy v. Meconi, 395 F. Supp. 2d 132, 138 (D. Del. 2005) 
("[l]n cases where a person has minimum contacts, a state must not deny equal 
protection of its laws to that person ... even if he is not physically within the state's 
territorial jurisdiction."). 
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thus bringing them within its jurisdiction-it would seem that 
others who are similarly situated but are not allowed to vote 
should be able to challenge that unequal treatment.1as 
But concluding that the Equal Protection Clause applies 
is just the start; applying the clause is complicated. OCVRA's 
opponents can argue for mere rational basis review (because 
private citizens are not a suspect class), but OCVRA's 
proponents can claim that strict scrutiny applies (because 
voting is a fundamental right). It is not clear how the Supreme 
Court would have answered these questions in 1975, but more 
recent case law has constructed a test requiring that in 
"evaluating a constitutional challenge to an election regulation 
[a court must] weigh the asserted injury to the right to vote 
against the 'precise interests put forward by the State as 
justifications for the burden imposed by its rule."'1as 
It is unfortunately unclear how the Court would handle 
states' differential treatment of public and private expatriates. 
For one thing, it is uncertain just what justifications the states 
would proffer for the differential treatment. Perhaps federal· 
employees are easier to track, 137 or perhaps there is a greater 
public interest in and sympathy for accommodating their 
deployments overseas.13s In the related context of the census, 
courts have approved the inclusion of overseas federal 
employees even while private citizens are entirely excluded.139 
135 See id. at 137-38. 
136 Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190 (2008) (quoting 
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983)). Three other Justices, led by Scalia, rejected 
the Court's formulation in: favor of a more categorical approach. See id. at 204-05 (Scalia, 
J., concurring) ('"[S]trict scrutiny is appropriate only if the burden is severe.' Thus, the 
first step is to decide whether a challenged law severely burdens the right to vote." 
(alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 592 
(2005))). But two other Justices, while dissenting .on the merits, agreed more with the 
majority's approach. See id. at 209 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[A] State may not burden the 
right to vote merely by invoking abstract interests, be they legitimate, or even compelling, 
but must make a particular, factual showing that threats to its interests outweigh the 
particular impediments it has imposed." (citation omitted)); cf lgartua De La Rosa v. 
United States, 32 F.3d 8, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1994) (using rational basis standard in case 
challenging nonapplication of UOCAV A to people moving to Puerto Rico, because no 
fundamental rights were infringed nor suspect classes affected). 
137 See Utah v. Evans, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1391 (D. Utah 2001) (using this 
to justify the census counting certain overseas public employees but not their private 
counterparts). 
138 This sentiment seems to have animated the preferential treatment given to 
military personnel in the law that preceded OCVRA. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 84-580, at 3 
(1955); cf Evans, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1300-01. But see Davidson, supra note 73, at 482 
(rejecting attempts to differentiate public and private expatriates)_ 
139 See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 792-93 (1992) (challenging 
1990 Census); Evans, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1293 (challenging 2000 Census); cf House 
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Most significantly for the purposes of this article, the category 
of public expatriates serving the country is distinguishable 
from the category of private, permanent expatriates who have 
left the United States with no intention of ever returning. 
It is also unclear how the Court would view the 
infringement of the right to vote in this situation. As discussed, 
permanent expatriates do not have any constitutional right to 
vote in the states where they no longer live; no right, no 
infringement. 140 If the infringement is instead understood as 
violating permanent expatriates' right to equal treatment, 
though, it becomes more important that private employment is 
not a suspect classification. The states would still need an 
adequate reason for this discrimination to pass rational basis 
review-and again, it is uncertain just what their reasons 
might be-but the bar would be low. 
By contrast, consider the very different result when 
there really is a right to vote being violated. In Carrington v. 
Rash, the Supreme Court struck down a Texas law that barred 
people who moved to Texas in the course of their military duty 
from ever voting in Texas as long as they remained in the 
military. 141 Discriminating between "qualified voters within the 
state" on the basis of their occupation was simply not 
permissible, the Court said.142 But the key language here is 
"within the state," and the case the Court quoted for that 
phrase put it even more starkly. 
Once the geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen 
is designated, all who participate in the election are to have an equal 
vote-whatever their race, whatever their sex, whatever their 
occupation, whatever their income, and wherever their home may be 
in that geographical unit. This is required by the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment .... [T]here is no indication in 
the Constitution that ... occupation affords a permissible basis for 
distinguishing between qualified voters within the State. 143 
In other words, even the argument for private expatriates' 
equality is greatly weakened by the fact that they are not 
residents of their former states. 
This suggests a narrower approach that might have 
worked better for OCVRA's proponents. If OCVRA had framed 
Hearings, supra note 18, at 261 (testimony of Mary C. Lawton, Deputy Assistant Att'y 
Gen.) (noting complications OCVRA presents for the census). 
140 See supra text accompanying notes 105-114. 
141 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). 
142 Id. at 96 (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963)). 
143 Gray, 372 U.S. at 379-80 (emphasis added). 
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the issue as making it easier for private expatriates to prove-on 
equal terms with public expatriates-that they retained their 
stateside domiciles, it would have been much easier for Congress 
to rely on authority like Carrington to establish a claim for 
authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
OCVRA's opponents did not dispute that bona fide residents were 
entitled to equal treatment when they were abroad regardless of 
whether they were publicly or privately employed.144 But by 
granting voting rights outright to nonresidents qua nonresidents, 
Congress undermined itself. 
None of this is to say that OCVRA (and by extension, 
UOCAVA) would necessarily lose the equal protection argument. 
It might be that even nonresidents who are not members of a 
suspect class might have enough of a right to equal treatment 
here to trump whatever justifications a state could offer. But even 
if that is so, it is unclear that OCVRA's remedy-enfranchising 
them-is an appropriate one. Given all the other problems with 
letting nonresidents vote, a better remedy might have been to 
disenfranchise all permanent expatriates, including the public 
ones, or to disenfranchise only the most detached-but on equal 
terms for public and private expatriates. Perhaps that would have 
been a tough sell politically, but legally, that is beside the point. 
iv. Residency Requirements 
The Senate's final finding was that residence 
requirements did not "bear a reasonable relationship to any 
compelling State interest in the conduct of Federal elections," 
which was its relaxed version of the test needed at the time to 
determine that an infringement of a fundamental right was 
justified. 145 OCVRA's proponents noted that while residence 
requirements might make sense for determining eligibility to 
vote in state and local elections, federal elections were more 
about national issues.146 The proponents took pains to have the 
record reflect that there were hundreds of thousands of 
overseas citizens who were well informed and interested in the 
144 See Shurtz, supra note 6, at 145. 
145 Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972) (quoting Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (requiring-more strictly-that infringements be 
"necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest" (emphasis added))). 
146 See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 18, at 17 (comments of Sen. Mathias) 
(contrasting expatriates' interest in national versus local issues and conceding their 
disconnection with the latter). 
472 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:2 
doings of the federal government.147 Given this national scope, 
having eligibility turn on one's local address did not seem 
"compelling'' to the proponents. 
This factor does not really add to the legal argument, 
though. If one believes (as one should) that the Constitution 
requires states to choose their representatives and senators by a 
vote of eligible "people of the state," then it is not only a 
compelling state interest but also a constitutional necessity for 
the state to have some sort of residence requirement. Even if it 
would be theoretically acceptable for the state to define former 
residents as current "people of the state," it is hard to argue that 
the Constitution requires anything of the sort. 148 Conversely, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that even when nonresidents have 
a direct interest in the workings of an area's government, that is 
not sufficient to give them a right to vote there.149 
Even those who do not credit the People of the States 
Clauses with this much potency must confront the fact that a 
state and its people have an interest in effective representation 
of themselves in Congress. Here too, voting is a matter not just 
of citizenship but also of place. This junction is summed up 
perfectly by the Supreme Court's declaration that "a citizen has 
a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on 
an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction."150 
Members of the House and Senate represent constituencies, 
which is a term for both the land in a state or district and the 
people in it. 151 When someone who no longer lives in a 
147 See H.R. REP. No. 94-649, at 2 (1975); Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 
78 (testimony of Eugene L. Stockwell, Associate General Secretary, National Council of 
Churches); id. at 69-70 (testimony of Sargent Shriver, Chairman, Ambassadors Comm. 
for Voting by Americans Overseas). 
148 Cf. Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 64 (testimony of Mary C. Lawton, 
Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.) (rejecting notion that abolition of residency requirements 
is "plainly adapted" (in the words of the test used at the time) to securing Fourteenth 
Amendment rights). 
149 See Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 70 (1978) ("The line 
heretofore marked by this Court's voting qualifications decisions coincides with the 
geographical boundary of the governmental unit at issue, and we hold that appellants' 
case, like their homes, falls on the farther side."). 
150 Dunn, 405 U.S. at 336 (emphasis added). The Dunn Court also noted that 
"[a]n appropriately defined and uniformly applied requirement of bona fide residence may 
be necessary to preserve the basic conception of a political community, and therefore 
could withstand close constitutional scrutiny." Id. at 343-44 (emphasis added); see also 
Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 65 (testimony of Mary C. Lawton, Deputy Assistant 
Att'y Gen.); Gura, supra note 6, at 192. 
151 See Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 63 (testimony of Mary C. Lawton, 
Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.) (noting that legislators "represent local and State 
interests"); House Hearings, supra note 18, at 90 (comments of Rep. Wiggins) ("There is 
nothing to support that a Member of Congress is a national legislator either, he is a 
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constituency gets to vote there, it subverts the jurisdiction's 
democratic geography and clouds the question of whom the 
elected member represents. 152 Anyone who votes in the district 
obviously has a claim on the member's attention-that is the 
whole point of democratic elections-but for people outside the 
constituency and beyond the state's jurisdiction to get that sort 
of attention is constitutionally uncomfortable. The state's 
interest in preventing that certainly seems compelling. 
To be sure, nonresident citizens do retain an· interest in 
the operation of the federal government, and a distinct one at 
that. This is particularly so given that, almost alone in the world, 
the United States requires its expatriates to pay taxes on their 
foreign income.153 One might say, then, that an appropriate 
corollary of the founding era's slogan of "no taxation without 
representation" is "with taxation comes representation."1s4 But 
there is no such clause in the Constitution. Even if there were, 
ceasing to tax these people would solve the problem just as well as 
giving them the vote does. More to the point, it would do so 
without contravening the People of the States Clauses, which 
definitely are in the Constitution and are entitled to 
acknowledgment and respect. 
c. Oregon v. Mitchell 
Despite all of these constitutional objections, OCVRA's 
proponents had a potent weapon in reserve: .Oregon u. MitchellJ55 
Not only did Mitchell offer several bases for Congress's power to 
protect the rights to vote and travel, it also specifically approved 
forcing states to let former residents vote in them. 
But OCVRA's opponents had strong, convincing 
responses. To start, Mitchell saw the Court fracture and issue 
five opinions, none of which commanded majority supportJ56 
The result in Mitchell was the law of the land, but none of the 
reasoning contained in it was. Of course, OCVRA only would 
have needed five Justices' votes to be upheld, regardless of 
representative of a district and a State."). But see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 
(1964) ("Legislators represent people, not trees or acres."). 
152 See Shurtz, supra note 6, at 153-54. 
153 See supra note 17. 
154 See H.R. REP. No. 94-649, at 11 (1975) (supplemental views of Rep. 
Frenzel) (''These people pay U.S. taxes, are U.S. citizens and should be allowed to vote 
in U.S. elections."). 
155 See supra Section II.A.l. 
156 See House Hearings, supra note 18, at 254-55 (testimony of Mary C. 
Lawton, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.) (noting fractured nature of Mitchell). 
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whether those five agreed on a rationale. But peel away just 
one of the votes from Mitchell for being inapplicable to overseas 
voting, and the case would not save OCVRA at all. 
Mitchell reviewed several parts of the Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1970. The ones relevant here are the lowering of 
the voting age to 18 and the restrictions on length-of-residency 
requirements in presidential elections. The voting-age provision 
had the complete support of only four Justices (Douglas in one 
opinion, and Brennan, White, and Marshall in another), who 
believed that it violated equal protection for states to bar 18- to 
20-year-olds from voting in federal or state elections.t57 More 
precisely, they believed that Congress could reasonably conclude 
this by using the deferential approach to Fourteenth Amendment 
Section 5 power seen in Katzenbach u. Morgan. 158 
Justice Black voted to uphold the voting-age provision 
only as applied to federal elections. 159 He did not use the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 160 Instead, he noted that while the 
Constitution gave the states the power to regulate the "Times, 
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives," it also provided that "Congress may at any 
time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the 
Places of chusing Senators."161 Significantly, Justice Black 
believed that the Elections Clause empowered Congress to set 
voter-qualification standards, presumably as part of the 
"manner" of holding elections. 162 
It is easy to see how those members of Congress who cared 
might have thought that this lineup of votes boded well for 
OCVRA's enfranchisement of permanent expatriates. As in 
Mitchell, OCVRA's defenders could ignore the four dissenters and 
simply cobble together five votes from those Justices who (1) 
deferred to Congress's sense that Fourteenth Amendment rights 
were at stake or (2) thought Congress had a general power to 
prescribe voter qualifications in congressional elections. But 
Justice Black, the crucial fifth vote, had died in 1971. 
Commanding only one vote, Justice Black's reasoning did not 
157 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 135-44 (1970) (opinion of Douglas, J.); id. 
at 239-81 (opinion of Brennan, J.). 
ISS I d. at 141 (opinion of Douglas, J.) (applying Morgan and its broad approach 
to Section 5); id. at 248 (opinion of Brennan, J.) (asking, per Morgan, whether Congress 
made a reasonable determination that a factual basis existed to lind a Fourteenth 
Amendment violation); see supra text accompanying notes 65-67. 
159 Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 119-31 (opinion of Black, J.). 
'
60 Id. at 126-30 (opinion of Black, J.). 
161 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4; Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 119-24 (opinion of Black, J.). 
162 Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 119-24 (opinion of Black, J.). 
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represent any sort of binding precedent. There was little prospect 
of anyone else agreeing with his broad reading of Congress's 
"manner" power.ls3 
In declining to endorse Justice Black's views, moreover, 
the other eight Justices were on solid ground. By conflating 
voter qualifications with the "manner" in which an election was 
held, Justice Black's Elections Clause approach ignored Article 
I, Section 2, Clause 1, which is explicitly devoted to voter 
qualifications. 164 The Supreme Court recently reiterated that 
Justice Black's approach is disfavored, stating that "the 
Elections Clause [only] empowers Congress to regulate how 
federal elections are held, but not who may vote in them," and 
noting how a majority in Mitchell specifically rejected Justice 
Black's expansive vision of the Elections Clause.l65 It is 
therefore hard to see how Mitchell's approval of lowering the 
voting age legitimizes OCVRA in any way. 
In the other relevant portion of Mitchell, the Court 
upheld the portion of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 
1970 that barred states from imposing durational residency 
requirements of longer than 30 days in presidential elections 
and gave voters who had been in their new states for fewer 
than 30 days a right to vote in presidential elections in their 
old states. In some ways, this was even more helpful for 
OCVRA's proponents. Eight Justices voted to uphold this part 
of the statute (albeit in four distinct opinions). 166 Moreover, this 
dealt with residency requirements-including forcing states to 
let former residents vote in them-and thus spoke more 
directly to the issues at hand with OCVRA. 
Nevertheless, OCVRA was, again, distinguishable enough 
that the proponents' confident use of Mitchell was misguided. One 
difference was that this part of the Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1970 only applied to presidential elections.1s1 
While the various opinions in Mitchell signaled that the 
Amendments would have been constitutional if they had applied 
to congressional elections as well, those signals were dicta-some 
163 See Shurtz, supra note 6, at 147-48. 
164 Criticisms of Justice Black appear in House Hearings, supra note 18, at 
255 (testimony of Mary C. Lawton, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.), Senate Hearings, 
supra note 42, at 62 (testimony of Mary C. Lawton, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.), and 
H.R. REP. No. 94-649, at 19 (1975) (minority views); infra Section II.B.l. 
165 Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2257-58, 
2258 n.8 (2013). 
166 Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 118-19 (opinion of Black, J.) (summarizing votes on 
this question)_ 
167 See Shurtz, supra note 6, at 149. 
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of them quite subtle-and did not confront the People of the 
States Clauses.l68 Indeed, the Amendments' failure to reach 
beyond presidential elections reflected their sponsors' specific 
desire to leave states in control of congressional elections. 169 
A more important difference is that Mitchell dealt with 
the right to travel within the United States rather than with 
the (more limited) right to live abroad. Only the former right 
has the specific protection of Article IV of the Constitution, 
which precludes states from treating their citizens (i.e., 
residents) differently for being new arrivals from another 
state.17o Additionally, Supreme Court case law has placed limits 
on the right to move abroad that it has not placed on the right 
to move between states. 171 
An even greater reason that this aspect of Mitchell's 
holding could not justify OCVRA was that the Court only 
approved an administrative fix at the margins of residency 
requirements, while OCVRA essentially gutted residency 
requirements.172 The Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 
declared that people could vote for President in their former 
state of residence for only 30 days; people who had been gone 
longer than that could vote-could only vote-in their new 
states. The law's main thrust was the latter part, preventing 
new states from requiring more than 30 days of residence. 
Congress decided that states did not need longer than that to 
process their new arrivals as voters. 173 Some processing time 
168 See Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 134 (opinion of Black, J.) (approving regulation of 
presidential elections because of Congress's general power "to regulate federal elections"); 
id. at 149 (opinion of Douglas, J.) (speaking in terms of "[t]he right to vote for national 
officers," which seemingly includes Congress); id. at 287 (opinion of Stewart, J.) (stating 
gratuitously that the reasons that justify the statute apply to "any federal election, 
whether congressional or presidential"); id. at 237-38 (opinion of Brennan, J.) (speaking of 
the right of interstate migration in the context of "federal elections"); Senate Hearings, 
supra note 42, at 237 & n.2 (statement of J. Eugene Marans, Counsel, Bipartisan Comm. 
on Absentee Voting) (noting supportive dicta in each majority opinion); see also H.R. REP. 
No. 94-649, at 7; S. REP. NO. 94-121, at 7 (1975). 
169 See Hearings on Voting Rights Act of 1965 Amendments, supra note 68, at 
288 (comments of Sen. Goldwater) (noting that the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 
1970, for which he was advocating, covered only presidential elections because "the 
States must retain" control over determining eligibility for congressional elections). · 
11o U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
171 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
172 See House Hearings, supra note 18, at 256 (testimony of Mary C. Lawton, 
Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.) (distinguishing Voting Rights Act Amendments' 30-day 
applicability from OCVRA's much further reach); H.R. REP. No. 94-649, at 17-18 
(minority views) (distinguishing Mitchell as concerning only durational residency 
requirements); Shurtz, supra note 6, at 150. 
173 Given Americans' tremendous mobility, durational residency requirements 
had a substantial disenfranchising effect; one commentator conservatively estimates 
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was required, though, and it was only fair to say that until you 
had been processed in your new state, you were still a voter in 
your old one. OCVRA, by contrast, gave permanent expatriates 
the right to vote in their former states forever, not just for the 
brief time it took to be processed in a new location. The limited 
actions approved in Mitchell do not amount to any sort of 
declaration by the Court that Congress has a general power 
either to force states to let former residents vote there or to gut 
state residency requirements. 
d. The Original Case Against OCVRA in Sum 
OCVRA's constitutional critics had a strong case in 1975 
that OCVRA ran afoul of the People of the States Clauses. 
OCVRA's proponents responded that those clauses mattered less 
than U.S. citizens' inherent rights to vote in federal elections and 
live wherever they choose. But the right to vote is not a right to 
vote in a particular place; the right to live abroad is relatively 
weak and not guaranteed by the Constitution to be costless; and 
the Supreme Court has taken pains to say that it is never a 
constitutional violation for states to limit voting to their bona fide 
residents. Properly understood, these constitutional principles 
need not entail-and cannot justify-violating the People of the 
States Clauses. 
The strongest argument for OCVRA was that it rectified 
unequal treatment between the public and private sector. But even 
if that constituted an equal protection violation (an uncertain 
proposition at best), it did not mean that enfranchising all of the 
private expatriates was the appropriate remedy. Requiring all 
voters to be bona fide residents would have provided just as much 
equality with none of the attendant unconstitutionality. 
B. Arguments Since 1975 
There are other significant arguments that OCVRA's 
critics either did not make or did not press to the same degree. 
Some of this reflects changes in Supreme Court jurisprudence in 
the intervening 40 years. At any rate, a full consideration of the 
constitutional case against UOCAVA require·s contemplating 
these other arguments. 
them to have affected 5%-10% of the nation's adult population. KEYSSAR, supra note 23, 
at 151. 
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While OCVRA's critics expressed deep concern that it 
violated the People of the States Clauses, they made only 
passing reference to the problems it might create with the 
neighboring Qualifications Clauses. 174 Being a "person of the 
state" is a necessary but not sufficient basis for voting in 
congressional elections; Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 and the 
Seventeenth Amendment also require that "the electors in each 
state" for U.S. House and Senate elections "shall have the 
qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch 
of the state legislature[s]."175 In other words, these clauses state 
plainly that in order to vote in congressional elections, one must 
be qualified to vote in state-house elections. OCVRA violates this 
symmetry requirement. 
The Constitution leaves it largely to the states to define 
the electorate for state house. 176 The limits on state discretion 
here are mainly structural. The Guaranty Clause requires that 
the states have a republican form of government, which suggests 
that the franchise must be relatively broad, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment penalizes states that deny their inhabitants the 
franchise. 177 States also cannot define their electorates in a way 
that violates constitutional standards, such as those that protect 
voting rights by race, sex, and age. 178 Congress has the power to 
legislate to enforce those voting rights, as well as to enforce due 
process and equal protection rights more generally. 179 But 
Congress's power here is not specific to federal elections; the 
174 See, e.g., Transcript on S. 95, supra note 47, at 53-55 (comments of Rep. 
Wiggins) (dismissing symmetry issue despite overall deep constitutional concerns 
about OCVRA). 
175 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; id. amend. XVII. The quoted language appears 
in both clauses, differing only in capitalization, and in the final "s," which appears only 
in the Seventeenth Amendment. 
176 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 243-44 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
177 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (penalizing states 
that deny the vote to adult, male, nonrebel, noncriminal inhabitants). Robert W. 
Bennett has offered two possible definitions of the Guaranty Clause: "a government 
answerable ultimately to the people, rather than a monarchy or an aristocracy," or, 
more narrowly, "popular government in which policy choices are made by a 
representative assembly." Robert W. Bennett, Originalism: Lessons from Things That 
Go Without Saying, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 645, 657 (2008). I am relying on the former 
definition; Bennett favors the second and uses it to raise questions about the 
constitutionality of direct democracy. See id. 
178 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (protecting voting rights by race); id. amend. XIX 
(protecting voting rights by sex); id. amend. XXVI (extending voting rights to 18-year-olds). 
179 See id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV,§ 2; id. amend. XIX, § 2; id. amend. 
XXVI,§ 2. 
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Qualifications Clauses' symmetry requirement is just the 
mechanism for enforcing these rights in federal elections. 
As previously noted,1B0 the Supreme Court recognized 
this structure in Katzenbach u. Morgan, years before OCVRA 
introduced the current problems into federal law: "States 
establish qualifications for voting for state officers, and the 
qualifications established by the States for voting for members 
of the most numerous branch of the state legislature also 
determine who may vote for United States Representatives and 
Senators .... "181 Congress can step in to enforce other 
constitutional requirements that the states might violate, but 
even then the Qualifications Clauses' symmetry requirement 
remains-plain as day. 
UOCA VA (and before it, OCVRA) violates the symmetry 
requirement because in each state's congressional elections it 
generates nonresident voters who are not qualified to vote for 
state house. As a matter of textual interpretation, this is 
another seemingly easy call. UOCAVA violates the symmetry 
requirement as clearly as any law could.J82 
To defend this conduct, proponents offered the same 
response that they had for the People of the States Clauses: in the 
name of vindicating voting and travel rights, Congress had the 
power simply to ignore the Qualifications Clauses. Recall the 
House Committee Report's language to this effect, stating that 
these constitutional provisions "are not sufficient to prevent 
Congress from protecting a person who exercises ... [the right to 
travel] when Congress may protect this right from other less 
·fundamental disabilities," and noting Justice Stewart's statement 
in his Oregon u. Mitchell concurrence/dissent that the federal 
power to vindicate rights supersedes the states' power to define 
the franchise. 183 As with the People of the States Clauses, 
however, there was no basis for Congress to conclude that it could 
simply ignore this part of the constitutional structure.1s4 
To be fair to the committee, Justice Stewart did denigrate 
the symmetry requirement in his opinion. He started out by 
18o See sttpra text accompanying note 63. 
181 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 647 (1966) (citations omitted); see 
also Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 663 (1884) ("[The states] define who are to vote 
for the popular branch of their own legislature, and the Constitution of the United 
States says the same persons shall vote for members of Congress in that State."). 
1sz See Shurtz, supra note 6, at 133; Gura, supra note 6, at 187 n.38. 
18" H.R. REP. No. 94-649, at 7 (1975); see supra text accompanying note 85. 
184 See supra text accompanying notes 85-89. 
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paying it lip service1s5 but concluded that the statutory provision 
he was discussing (the abolition of residency requirements longer 
than 30 days) could apply to congressional elections without 
applying to state-house elections.1B6 Though he did not really 
explain why, Justice Stewart apparently believed that the pursuit 
of an appropriate objective-in the case of Mitchell, vindicating 
the right to interstate travel-could trump the symmetry 
requirement.1B7 But Justice Stewart's opinion was the only one of 
the five in Mitchell that discussed the symmetry requirement in 
the context of the 30-day cap-no surprise, since the cap did not 
even apply to congressional elections, just to presidential ones. 
The cap thus did not implicate the symmetry requirement, and 
Justice Stewart's statement was entirely gratuitous. 1ss 
More problematic is that the committee reporting on 
OCVRA, following Justice Stewart, viewed the right to travel 
and the symmetry requirement as somehow being at odds with 
each other. Rather than say that the symmetry requirement 
could be ignored so that it would not defeat the right to travel 
abroad, the committee could have and should have respected 
both the requirement and the right. 1s9 Doing so would have 
meant using federal law to force states to let nonresidents vote 
in federal and state elections. The committee was unwilling to 
push the right to travel that far, but the symmetry 
requirement meant that they had to do either that or nothing. 
Ironically, the committee ignored another part of Mitchell 
that directly implicated-and seemingly undermined-the 
symmetry requirement. As discussed, the Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1970 required states to allow 18-year-olds to vote 
in both federal and state elections.190 The change was effective 
185 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 288-89 (1970) (opinion of Stewart, J.) 
(contending that "a state law that purported to establish distinct qualifications for 
congressional elections would be invalid as repugnant to Art. I, § 2, and the 
Seventeenth Amendment," and that Congress lacks the power to do so, as well 
(citations omitted)). 
186 Id. at 292 (opinion of Stewart, J.). 
187 ld. (concluding that the statute was not actually setting qualifications, but 
rather was an attempt to protect the right to travel). 
188 ld. at 287 (opinion of Stewart, J.) ("I have concluded that, while § 202 
applies only to presidential elections, nothing in the Constitution prevents Congress 
from protecting those who have moved from one State to another from 
disenfranchisement in any federal election, whether congressional or presidential."). 
189 Cf. id. at 128 (opinion of Black, J.) ("[T)here are at least three limitations 
upon Congress' power to enforce the guarantees of the Civil War Amendments. First, 
Congress may not by legislation repeal other provisions of the Constitution."). 
190 See supra Section II.A.2.c. 
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January 1, 1971.191 The Mitchell Court approved the federal 
extension just before that but struck down the state extension, 
thus decoupling the congressional electorate from the state-house 
electorate.192 Although symmetry was restored before the next 
Election Day via the swift passage and ratification of the Twenty-
Sixth Amendment,193 Mitchell's holding nevertheless represented 
an apparent strike against the symmetry requirement. 
Even if it was aware of that precedent, though, the 
committee was right to ignore it. Four Justices had voted to 
approve the statute's application to both state and federal 
elections. Four Justices had voted to reject its application to 
both. Justice Black was the only one who thought that it could 
apply to federal but not state elections. For good measure, 
neither he nor the other Justices bothered to discuss symmetry 
at all. Although this fractured vote yielded a final result that 
violated the symmetry requirement, it also represented an 
eight-to-one vote consistent with symmetry.l94 
More than a decade after OCVRA's enactment, the 
Supreme Court addressed the symmetry requirement for the 
first time and did so in a way that appears at first glance to 
give some cover to UOCA VA. In Tashjian v. Republican Party 
of Connecticut, the Court approved of a state having open 
primaries for congressional elections but not for state offices, 
19 1 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 305, 84 
Stat. 314, 319. 
192 Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 117-18 (opinion of Black, J.). 
193 Mitchell was decided on December 21, 1970. Id. at 112. Congress passed the 
amendment, which guaranteed 18-year-olds the right to vote in state elections too, in 
March 1971. The ratification was completed on July 1, 1971, the speediest ever 
ratification of a federal constitutional amendment. See DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPUCIT & 
AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776-1995, at 368 (1996). There 
were two special elections to the 92nd Congress between the Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1970's effective date (January 1, 1971) and the Amendment's ratification 
on July 1, 1971. See 92nd United States Congress, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/92nd_United_States_Congress [http://perma.cc/C2TL-VUH3] (last visited Feb. 29, 
2016} (listing special House elections). Maryland had a special election in its First 
District on May 25, but Maryland had already amended its state law to lower the 
voting age to 18 for state elections as well, so there was no symmetry violation. 1971 
Md. Laws 757. South Carolina had a special election in its First District on April 27, 
and 18-year-olds presumably voted, but South Carolina had not yet amended its 
eligibility requirements for state elections. There were no state-house elections held in 
South Carolina between April27 and July 1, though, so by a liberal measure, there' was 
no symmetry violation there either. See Email from Marion Chandler, Archivist, S.C. 
Dep't of Archives and History, to Barbara Bean, Reference Librarian (Mar. 3, 2014, 
15:16 EST) (on file with author). 
194 See Shurtz,. supra note 6, at 134 (making this point). 
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even though that meant defining the (primary) electorate 
differently for state versus federal elections. 195 
In so holding, the Court said that the Qualifications 
Clauses do not require actual symmetry and instead function 
as a floor. Writing for a five-Justice majority, Justice Marshall 
relied on a contratextual version of the Framers' purpose in 
drafting Article I, Section 2.196 As he interpreted the history, 
the Framers were concerned that any national standard for 
suffrage-whether written into the Constitution or entrusted to 
Congress to legislate-might have been too restrictive and thus 
distasteful to the states with more liberal voter-eligibility 
laws. 197 Since those states would not want to disenfranchise 
part of their electorates, the Framers needed to allow state-by-
state determinations of qualifications but ensure that the 
federal electorate was at least as broad as the state electorate. 
Because their purpose was thus to protect suffrage 
rather than restrict it, Justice Marshall said, the Qualifications 
Clauses' purpose is satisfied if all state-house voters can also 
vote in congressional elections.I98 Once that condition is met, 
adding more people to the congressional electorate is no 
problem. This is what the Court had done in Mitchell-
allowing 18-year-olds to vote in federal, but not state 
elections-and Justice Marshall cited the case as precedent for 
his theory. 199 This surely gives some ammunition to those who 
would defend UOCA VA from the charge of unconstitutional 
antisymmetry. UOCAVA seemingly passes the Tashjian test 
because it only adds to the federal electorate, and it does 
nothing to bar any state-house voters from participating in 
congressional elections. 
There is ample ammunition on the other side, though. 
First, consider the dissent in Tashjian by Justice Stevens, 
joined by an unlikely bedfellow, Justice Scalia. Justice Stevens 
began by scoffing at the way the majority rewrote the 
Qualifications Clauses' clear "shall have" language to read 
"need not have."200 Whatever the Framers' intentions here, 
195 Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986). Because of 
Connecticut's setup, independent voters would be able to vote in congressional 
primaries but not state-house primaries. 
196 Id. at 227-28. 
197 ld. 
198 See id. at 229; see also James L. Craig, Jr., A Shared Sovereignty Solution 
to the Conundrum of District of Columbia Congressional Representation, 57 How. L.J. 
235, 262 n.89 (2013); Davidson, supra note 73, at 485-86. 
199 Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 229. 
2oo Id. at 231 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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their text was clear and unambiguous in reqmrmg symmetry 
rather than a floor. Justice Stevens continued by providing a 
compelling challenge to the majority's view of the Framers' 
purpose.2o1 Finally, he refuted Justice Marshall's conclusion 
that Mitchell was a precedent for his asymmetric view of the 
Qualifications Clauses (though, like Justice Marshall, he 
ignored two other asymmetric precedents).202 
Justice Stevens's dissent, while strong, had only two 
votes behind it. Nevertheless, UOCAV A is problematic even if 
2o1 The majority noted that in adopting the final language of the Qualifications 
Clause, the Framers were rejecting a proposal for a national standard for eligibility to 
vote in congressional elections, worrying that it might be distastefully restrictive to some 
states. Justice Stevens pointed out, however, that the symmetry requirement was in 
place in the draft that the Convention was considering before the unsuccessful proposal 
for a national standard was made. The desire for a broader electorate explained the 
rejection of the proposal, but it did not account for the presence of the symmetry 
requirement in the first place. ld. at 227·33 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
"o2 Justice Stevens noted the point made above: eight Justices in Mitchell 
voted consistently with symmetry and only one voted against it. ld. at 233 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); see supra text accompanying notes 190-194. Thus Mitchell does not really 
provide an argument, let alone a precedent, against the symmetry requirement. It is 
interesting that, especially given the weakness of the Mitchell precedent here, neither 
Justice Marshall nor Justice Stevens cited the two other relevant precedents on 
asymmetry. One concerned literacy tests. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 placed certain 
sorts of limits on literacy tests-mainly requiring that they be applied fairly-but only 
in federal elections. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 101(a), 78 Stat. 
241, 241. This arguable asymmetry was partially cured by the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 (which suspended the use of literacy tests in all elections in places that had 
abused them) and completely cured by its amendments in 1970 (which banned all 
literacy tests, period, for five years) and 1975 (which made the ban permanent). See 
Shurtz, supra note 6, at 133 n.18 (describing this legislative sequence). The second 
precedent concerned poll taxes. Ratified in 1964, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment ended 
the use of poll taxes as a condition of voting, but only in federal elections. U.S. CONST. 
amend. XXIV, § 1. This set up an apparent violation of the symmetry requirement in 
the five states (Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia) that continued to 
require poll taxes in state elections, because nonpayers could vote in federal elections 
without being qualified to vote for state house. See DEANNE DURREIT, RIGHT TO VOTE 
23 (2005) (listing the five states). But the amendment, as such, could be read as 
amending the symmetry requirement as far as poll taxes were concerned. Indeed, a 
major reason that proponents had gone the amendment route rather than passing a 
statute to ban poll taxes in federal elections was precisely that such a statute was 
vulnerable to being struck down for violating the symmetry requirement. See Abolition 
of Poll Tax in Federal Elections: Hearings on H.J. Res. 404 et al. Before Subcomm. No. 
5 of the H. Comm. on the Jttdiciary, 87th Cong. 12, 25 (1962) (statement of Sen. 
Holland) (explaining rationale for using amendment process); Poll Tax: Hearings on 
H.R. 29 Before the S. Comm. on Rules and Admin., 80th Cong. 100 (1948) (statement of 
John M. Daniel, Att'y Gen. of South Carolina) (referring to objection to federa·l 
legislation on banning poll taxes in federal elections as violating symmetry 
requirement). In any case, the issue became moot when, in 1966, the Supreme Court 
restored symmetry by banning poll taxes in state elections as well. Harper v. Virginia 
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). Perhaps the reason that neither the literacy 
test asymmetry nor the poll tax asymmetry was mentioned in Tashjian was that 
neither had been approved by any court. In any case, their windows of asymmetry were 
both swiftly closed, in contrast to OCVRA/UOCAVA's, which has now been open for 
nearly 40 years. 
484 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:2 
one accepts the majority's reasoning. To be sure, Tashjian does 
reject the simple, textual version of symmetry. But it does not 
necessarily replace it with an equally simple floor. Regardless 
of whether the Framers thought that they were requiring 
formal symmetry or more generally protecting a broader 
franchise, the mechanism that they chose was federalism. 
Whether one focuses on their text or their intent, the one thing 
·that the Framers were clearly doing with the Qualifications 
Clauses was stopping the Convention or Congress from 
instituting a uniform national standard for federal voter 
eligibility.zos The problem with UOCAVA, then, is that even 
though it broadens the franchise, it does so by imposing just 
such a uniform national standard on the states-precisely what 
the Framers meant to avoid. This was no problem in Tashjian 
because the violation of symmetry in that case was perpetrated 
by the State of Connecticut, not by Congress. 2o4 UOCAVA, by 
contrast, violates not only the symmetry required by the 
Qualifications Clauses' text but also the federalist approach 
embodied in the structure of the Qualifications Clauses. 
Admittedly, both the past practice of asymmetry and the 
judicial treatment of the Qualifications Clauses cloud the simple 
textual argument that UOCAVA unconstitutionally decouples the 
state and federal electorates. But past asymmetries were all short 
lived and unapproved by courts.zo5 There is plenty of room to 
distinguish the two judicial precedents (Mitchell and Tashjian).206 
The best reading of the clauses precludes Congress from running 
roughshod over both the plain text and federalist structure of the 
Qualifications Clauses. 
203 As James Madison put it, "To have reduced the different qualifications in 
the different States, to one uniform rule, would probably have been as dissatisfactory 
to some of the States, as it would have been difficult to the Convention." THE 
FEDERALIST No. 52, at 256 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003). 
204 See also U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 865 (1995) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (discussing Tashjian floor theory in the context of state action). 
2os See supra note 202. 
206 There is at least one lower-court precedent on the side of symmetry. In 
Adams v. Clinton, a three-judge district court rejected a claim that residents of D.C. 
had a right to vote in federal elections as residents of Maryland, in part because they 
do not have the right to vote in elections for Maryland's state house as would be 
required by the Qualifications Clauses. Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35, 62 
(D.D.C.), affd sub nom. Alexander v. Mineta, 531 U.S. 940 (2000). 
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2. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and Recent 
Case Law 
OCVRA's proponents thought that Congress could pass 
the legislation using its power to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment.207 Their conception of Congress's Section 5 power 
was based on the Supreme Court's decision in Katzenbach u. 
Morgan, which freed Congress from being tightly limited by the 
courts' conception of what constituted a Fourteenth 
Amendment violation.2os 
But starting in 1997 with City of Boerne u. Flores, 209 the 
Supreme Court has taken a more restrictive view of Congress's 
Section 5 power.210 The Court has required that Section 5 
legislation respond to things that the Court agrees are actually 
Fourteenth Amendment violations, not just things that it can 
"perceive a basis upon which Congress might predicate a 
judgment" of a violation. 211 Moreover, the Court has required 
that in addressing violations, the legislation cannot sweep in 
too much other, nonviolative state action. 212 The Court has also 
required a showing that in passing the legislation, "Congress 
had evidence of a pattern of constitutional violations on the 
part of the States."213 Taken together, these requirements form 
the so-called "congruent and proportional" test. 
201 See supra Section II.A.l. 
2os See supra text accompanying notes 62-67. 
209 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
21o This line of cases has been somewhat inconsistent and reflects deep 
divisions on the Court. The Court began with a series of cases in which its conservative 
wing imposed a stricter version of the test. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356. 
(2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). Then, however, Justice 
O'Connor joined the liberal wing of the Court on this issue and provided a less 
restrictive approach. It is possible to reconcile both lines of cases by noting that in the 
cases taking the less restrictive approach, the Court found that a fundamental right 
was implicated. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (access to the courts); Nev. 
Dep't of Human Ref?. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (freedom from sex discrimination). 
The only Justice who never dissented in any of these cases was Justice O'Connor, but 
these cases are all still good law, so the search for a fundamental rights "hook" appears 
to have some salience. See, e.g., Coleman v. Ct. of App. of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012) 
(applying the congruent and proportional test in a way that turned on whether sex 
discrimination was implicated). Thus, in arguing about the likely results of a challenge 
to UOCA V A's enfranchisement of permanent expatriates, it seems reasonable to note 
conservatively that fundamental rights (to vote and travel) are implicated and for this 
article to therefore use the less restrictive approach. 
211 See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728 (citing Boerne for the notion that "it falls to this 
Court, not Congress, to define the substance" of Fourteenth Amendment violations in 
Section 5 cases); supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing former "perceive a 
basis" standard). 
212 See, e.g., Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 738. 
21a Id. at 729. 
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As discussed, it would have been difficult for OCVRA's or 
UOCAVA's enfranchisement of permanent expatriates to pass 
constitutional muster even under the more deferential Morgan 
approach.214 Under the post-Boerne "congruent and proportional" 
approach, though, it would be considerably harder, because the 
argument that bona fide residency requirements violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment now faces a higher bar.215 Put another 
way, it seems unlikely that permanent expatriates could have 
ever prevailed in a lawsuit accusing their former states of 
violating the Fourteenth Amendment by refusing to let them 
continue voting in federal elections there. The Supreme Court has 
defended states' bona fide residence requirements too many times 
to conclude that the Court does not really mean it. 216 Indeed, the 
Court has not only approved the states' use of residence 
requirements, it has recognized those requirements as being at 
the heart of eligibility.217 Coupled with the limits on the rights to 
VOte and travel abroad,2 I8 the notion Of a bona fide residence 
requirement being a violation of the Constitution seems like a 
stretch too far. Without a constitutional violation, Section 5 does 
not permit Congress to enfranchise permanent expatriates. 
The same is true for the (relatively stronger) equal 
protection claims. Recall that before OCVRA, the states were 
very liberal in construing the residence status of federal 
employees and their dependents, but fewer states were 
similarly generous to private expatriates.219 One could argue 
that the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to treat public 
and private expatriates the same in this regard. As already 
discussed, though, this equal protection argument suffers from 
some fundamental weaknesses, especially with regard to the 
overbreadth of the remedy that OCVRA perpetrated. 220 Indeed, 
the congruent and proportional test would be even more 
sensitive to this overbreadth. 
Finally, even if Fourteenth Amendment violations could 
be established by others-say, bona fide residents who were not 
adequately accommodated by their states' absentee registration 
21• See supra Section II.A.2.b. 
215 Cf. KENNETH R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30747, 
CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY TO STANDARDIZE NATIONAL ELECTION PROCEDURES 7 
(2003) (noting apparent reduction wrought by Boerne of congressional authority to 
regulate procedures, as opposed to voter qualifications, in federal elections). 
21s See supra notes 123-125 and accompanying text. 
217 See Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 68-69 (1978). 
21s See supra Section II.A.2.b. 
219 See supra text accompanying notes 32-33. 
22o See supra Section II.A.2.b.iii. 
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and voting procedures-it would not be a congruent and 
proportional response to that constitutional violation to sweep 
permanent expatriates in with those bona fide residents. The 
congruent and proportional test is designed to align Congress's 
use of its Section 5 power with the redress of actual 
constitutional violations. Congress need not protect permanent 
expatriates in order to protect their temporary-expatriate 
counterparts,221 and so here too OCVRA and UOCAVA are even 
more poorly poised to pass constitutional muster than they 
were 40 years ago. 
3. Apportionment and Dilution 
UOCAVA's enfranchisement of permanent expatriates 
is also constitutionally awkward because of how it interacts 
with representation in the House of Representatives. It affects 
both seat apportionment between the states and the drawing of 
district lines within each state. This argument was not part of 
the debate over OCVRA, but it deserves consideration. 
Every 10 years, based on the decennial census's count of 
residents "in each state," seats in the House of Representatives 
(and, by extension, electoral votes) are reapportioned among all 
the states.222 Each state's count includes nonresident federal 
employees living overseas and their dependents and is based on the 
"home of record" recorded in each federal employee's individual 
personnel file. 223 The home of record is distinct from a legal 
residence and from the employee's last residence before going 
overseas.224 The census does not, however, count private 
expatriates; other than federal employees, only those who are 
221 See supra text accompanying note 144. One might argue that 
enfranchising permanent expatriates is Jess important than enfranchising those on the 
margins-people who are not permanently gone but would have a hard time proving 
that fact. OCVRA's proponents were concerned that forcing such people to swear that 
they intended to return to a particular place would force them to choose between 
disenfranchisement and perjury. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 18, at 186 
(comments of Sargent Shriver, Chairman, Ambassadors · Comm. for Voting by 
Americans Overseas); id. at 13 (statement of Sen. Mathias); H.R. REP. No. 94-649, at 2 
(1975). Although UOCAVA has not been cast in such limited terms, perhaps a court 
could save it from being struck down via a narrowing construction that merely shifts 
the burden to the state to prove that a person was not coming back. See supra note 80 
(contemplating this reading). 
222 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; id. amend. XIV, § 2. 
223 See KLEKOWSKI VON KOPPENFELS, supra note 10, at 251-52. 
22• See Mark Steber, HOR vs. SLR: What's the Difference?, MILITARY.COM, 
http://www. military .com/money/personal-finance/taxes/home-of-legal-record-for-
taxes.html [http://perma.cc/55S6-S96Q] (last visited Feb. 29, 2016) (explaining "home of 
record" in military context). 
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physically present on counting day are included.225 Legal challenges 
to both the inclusion of the public expatriates and to the differential 
treatment of the private expatriates have been unsuccessful.226 
At the margins, changes like these can make the 
difference between a state keeping, losing, or gaining a seat in the 
House. In recent history, four censuses have counted overseas 
federal employees and their dependents at their homes of record, 
and in three of those instances it made a difference in 
apportionment.227 What makes this so objectionable is, first, that 
these public expatriates' "home of record" might not be the same 
as their voting residence. In other words, representation is 
calculated based on people who are counted as part of one state 
even if they are voting in another state-and living in neither. 
Second, private expatriates do not get counted anywhere, but they 
do vote. Thus, representation is calculated without regard to 
millions of people who are voting and who are distributed 
unevenly between the states. It is hard to say, given that the 
census does not count them, but it seems likely that including 
private expatriates in the population counts of the states in which 
they vote would often make a difference in apportionment.228 
To be fair to UOCA VA, there are already multiple 
disconnections between congressional apportionment and states' 
populations. First, apportionment is based on the state's entire 
225 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
22s See supra note 139. 
227 See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 792·93 (1992) (describing 
census practices). In 2010, based on data at Detailed Tables: Apportionment Population 
and Number of Representatives, by State: 2010 Census in Microsoft Excel Format, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/population/apportionment/files/Apportionment 
%20Population%202010.xls [http://perma.cdQBY2-H5YT] (last visited Feb. 29, 2016) and 
Detailed Tables: Overseas Population of the 50 States and the District of Columbia: 2010 
Census in Microsoft Excel Format, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/ 
population/apportionment/ftles/Overseas%20Population%202010.xls [http://perma.cc/V8U6-
CA9F] (last visited Feb. 29, 2016), including the overseas federal employees and 
dependents made no difference. In 2000, it gave North Carolina a seat at the expense of 
Utah. See Utah v. Evans, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1293 (D. Utah 2001). In 1990, it gave 
Washington State a seat at the expense of Massachusetts. See Franklin, 505 U.S. at 790-
91. In 1970, it gave Oklahoma a seat at the expense of Connecticut, a fact that occasioned 
no litigation but that is derivable from data found at U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1970 
CENSUS OF POPULATION viii (1972). 
22s See House Hearings, supra note 18, at 273 (statement of J. Eugene 
Marans, Counsel, Bipartisan Comm. on Absentee Voting) (showing estimated numbers 
of how many overseas citizens would vote in each state under OCVRA, with New York 
and California having larger shares of the total (19.4% and 15.2%) than their shares of 
the total votes in the 1972 presidential election (9.21% and 10. 76%)). Since the census 
does count public expatriates, analogous figures on how unevenly they are distributed 
between the states are illustrative. Nationally, 0.34% of the 50-state population came 
from public expatriates, ranging from 0.18% in New Jersey to 1.57% in Alaska. See 
supra note 227 (citing 2010 Census data that can be used to divide each state's public-
expatriate population by its total population). 
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population, not the number of voters.229 The proportion of 
nonvoters (noncitizens, children, disenfranchised felons, and the 
mentally incompetent) varies from state to state, and 
apportionment is much different than it would be if it were based 
on the number of potential voters.230 Second, the census is a 
decennial snapshot. By the time of the first congressional election 
under the new apportionment scheme, more than two-and-a-half 
years have already passed, and tens of millions of people have 
since moved between states.231 Third, the census counts some 
people in the state of their temporary residence instead of their 
state of domicile (where they vote).232 Still, it is even odder to base 
a state's apportionment in part on people who, at the time of the 
c.ensus, do not live in that or any other state and who may vote in 
another state.233 It is also odd to leave people out of a state's count 
when they do vote in that state. 
This oddness carries over into districting within states. 
When a state divides itself into congressional districts of equal 
population, at least some expatriates are not included as part of 
their districts' respective populations.2a4 The result is that after 
states painstakingly draw district lines, being careful to keep 
their respective populations as close to each other as the 
Constitution requires, UOCAVA sprinkles millions more people 
unevenly onto their maps.235 In districts with higher proportions 
of expatriate voters assigned to them, the voters who actually 
229 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
23o See Bennett, supra note 7 (presenting this fact and exploring some of its 
interesting implications). 
231 See U.S. Mover Rate Remains Stable At About 12 Percent Since 2008, 
Census Bureau Reports, POL. & Gov'T Bus., Apr. 2, 2015, at 69, 2015 WLNR 8966080 
(reporting that roughly one in nine Americans moves every year). 
232 Residence Rule and Residence Situations for the 2010 Census, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2010/resid_rules/resid_rules.html 
[http://perma.cc/7S3E·NBW4] Qast visited Feb. 29, 2016) ("Usual residence is defmed as the· 
place where a person lives and sleeps most of the time. This place is not necessarily the 
same as the person's voting residence or legal residence."). 
233 See Bennett, supra note 7, at 508 n.22. 
234 See House Hearings, supra note 18, at 91 (comments of Rep. Burton). 
235 See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) ("[A]s nearly as is 
practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as 
another's."); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983) (declaring unconstitutional a 
congressional districting plan in which the average district differed from the ideal by 
726 people); see also Tennant v. Jefferson Cty. Comm'n, 133 S. Ct. 3 (2012) (approving 
a plan in which the variation was only slightly smaller than the largest in Karcher, 
because the variation was justified by the state's interest in minimizing disruption and 
having districts follow county lines as much as possible). The districting problem was 
noted at the time OCVRA was being considered. See House Hearings, supra note 18, at 
91 (comments of Rep. Burton); see also id. (comments of J. Eugene Marans, Counsel, 
Bipartisan Comm. on Absentee Voting). 
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live there see the power of their votes diluted relative to 
resident-voters in other districts. 236 
Even aside from the uneven distribution of expatriate 
voters among districts, all resident-voters see their votes 
diluted.237 This is not "dilution" in the technical sense that the 
Voting Rights Act sets forth, 238 but rather is dilution in the 
ordinary sense of diminished power. Residents of a congressional 
district have the power to hold their representatives accountable 
for standing up for the interests of that district. That power is 
compromised when the representative is also answerable to other 
people239-people who do not live in the district and whose very 
right to vote is premised on the fact that, as expatriates, they 
have interests distinct from people living in the district.240 
One might argue that it is unlikely that any district will 
contain so many expatriates that this dilution will amount to 
much.241 This de minimis argument is self-defeating, though. 
Either permanent expatriates have significant voting power that 
ensures that their distinct interests are taken into account (in 
which case the resident-voters' ability to command the attention 
of their representatives is diluted), or the permanent expatriates 
do not register in their representatives' consciousness (in which 
case the entire enterprise of awkwardly placing the expatriates in 
that district to vote, as opposed to offering them other forms of 
representation,242 is pointless). 
236 Cf Bennett, supra note 7, at 510-12 (contemplating implications of uneven 
distribution between districts of citizens who are unable to vote). 
237 See Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 65 (testimony of Mary C. Lawton, 
Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.). 
23s C{. Gura, supra note 6, at 195 (noting UOCAVA case in which overseas 
voters could have diluted the resident Hispanic vote). 
239 Id. at 194 ("[T]here is something odd about how a neighborhood can be 
transformed over a period of decades, yet a long-gone voter, having once resided on a street 
that may no longer exist, may continue to influence its political representation."). 
240 See Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 63 (testimony of Mary C. Lawton, 
Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.) (noting that legislators represent local and state 
interests); House Hearings, supra note 18, at 103 (comments of Rep. Wiggins) ("What 
public interest is served by giving to a person who abandons a domicile in California, 
has no intent to return to California, has no connection with that State whatsoever, 
other than the fact that he left California, what public interest is served by permitting 
that person to participate along with those who do remain in the localities of their 
representatives?''); H.R. REP. No. 94-649, at 2 (1975) (noting expatriates' distinct 
interests); S. REP. No. 94-121, at 2 (1975) (same). 
241 See House Hearings, s-upra note 18, at 17 (comments of Rep. Dent). 
242 See infra Sections IV.B-C. 
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4. D.C. and the Territories 
Constitutional law obviously does not operate in a 
vacuum. All of the legal arguments presented against UOCAVA 
in this article so far are susceptible to three powerful, practical 
political points: millions of people have used UOCAVA to vote; 
their doing so has not caused the Republic to crumble; and it is 
highly undesirable to strip a group of law-abiding citizens of 
their right to vote. There is one other legal argument, however, 
that draws much of its power from similar practical political 
points. UOCA VA is unconstitutional because it enfranchises 
some U.S. citizens who don't live in a state while leaving out 
millions of others. 
By its terms, UOCAVA gives those who leave a state the 
right to continue voting in federal elections there as though 
they had never left. But this only applies to people who leave 
the United States entirely.243 If they move to another state, 
they can obviously vote there. If, however, they move to a part 
of the United States that is not a state,244 they have no right 
under UOCA VA to vote in their former state. If I were to move 
from East Lansing, Michigan, to North Korea-with no 
intention to return-! would retain the right to vote for 
President, for Michigan's two U.S. senators, and for the U.S. 
representative for Michigan's Eighth District. If instead, I 
moved from East Lansing to Puerto Rico, I would not be able to 
vote for President, Senate, or House.245 
The unfairness of the latter situation has been litigated-
without success-on multiple occasions as to presidential voting246 
and once with regard to congressional voting.24 7 In each case, the 
court has rejected the claim that UOCAVA requires that citizens 
m the territories get the same right to vote as permanent 
243 See 52 U.S.C.A. § 20310(5), (8) (West 2015) (defining "overseas voters" as 
being outside the United States, and defining the United States as "the several States, 
the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, 
and American Samoa"). Notably, this excludes the Northern Mariana Islands. · 
244 Each of these areas-Washington, D.C., Puerto Rico, Guam, American 
Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin Islands-have a majority-minority population, making the 
racial implications here unavoidable. 
245 See Gura, supra note 6, at 188-89. 
246 See, e.g., Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2001) (Puerto Rico); 
lgartua De La Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1994) (Puerto Rico); Att'y Gen. 
of Guam v. United States, 738 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1984) (Guam); see also Gura, sttpra 
note 6, at 195-97. It is unclear why these plaintiffs only sought to vote in presidential 
elections and not in congressional elections. 
247 Howard v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 976 F. Supp. 350 (0. Md. 
1996) (rejecting attempt by former Maryland resident to vote there, per UOCAVA, 
after moving to D.C.), a(f'd, 122 F. 3d 1061 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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expatriates. In doing so, however, these courts have laid bare the 
inherent contradictions at the heart of UQCA VA. 
The First Circuit, in lgartua De La Rosa v. United States, 
rejected a challenge to UOCAVA by people who had moved from 
states to Puerto Rico and then sought to vote for President in 
their former states.248 The court rejected the premise that 
UOCAVA discriminates between people who move out of the 
United States and people who move to Puerto Rico. Rather, the 
court said, UOCAVA distinguishes between people who remain in 
the United States and those who leave it.249 People who remain in 
the United States are thus not given any special rights by 
UOCAVA but instead are able to vote in federal elections 
wherever in the United States they happen to live.z5o In the case 
of Puerto Rico, that means voting for a nonvoting representative 
in the U.S. House (and not paying federal taxes) rather than 
voting for a real representative, two senators, and President. To 
the extent that those voting rights are substandard, the court 
attributed that to Puerto Rico's status as a nonstate, something 
for which UOCAVA is not responsible.251 If I moved to Florida, I 
would be treated to the same federal voting rights as other 
Floridians. And if I moved to Puerto Rico, I would be treated to 
the same raw deal as other Puerto Ricans. 
While it is true that UOCA VA could not, by statute, 
make Puerto Rico a state, UOCAVA's application in the 
territories exposes some of its fundamental flaws. The 
plaintiffs in lgartua were seeking to be enfranchised, but the 
problem with UOCA VA is primarily the converse: whom it 
enfranchises, not whom it leaves out. What the Puerto Rican 
plaintiffs showed was that the premises underlying UOCAVA's 
enfranchisement of permanent expatriates crumble when 
confronted with the treatment of U.S. citizens in Puerto Rico 
and the other territories. 
248 Igartua, 32 F.3d at 9. 
249 Id. at 10. The court declared that this is not a suspect classification, and 
because UOCAVA does not restrict voting rights but instead limits states' ability to 
restrict them (albeit not as much as the plaintiffs might have liked), it does not infringe 
on the fundamental right to vote. Id. 
2so Id. at 10-11, 11 n.3. 
2s1 Id. at 9-11. In 2000, the district court in Puerto Rico ruled that U.S. 
citizens in Puerto Rico had a constitutional right to vote for President. Igartua De La 
Rosa v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 2d 228 (D.P.R. 2000). This was swiftly overturned 
by the First Circuit in lgartua De La Rosa u. United States, 229 F.3d 80 (2000), though 
an impassioned concurrence "serve[ d) notice upon the political branches of government 
that it is incumbent upon them, in the first instance, to take appropriate steps to 
correct what amounts to an outrageous disregard for the rights of a substantial 
segment of its citizenry." Id. at 90 (Torruella, J., concurring). 
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Congress rooted its authority to pass OCVRA in the 
claim that it was unconstitutional for states to deny the right 
to vote in federal elections to their former residents who had 
moved overseas permanently. 252 But if those U.S. citizens' 
rights to vote and live where they please are both so hallowed 
that the citizens cannot be forced to choose one over the other, 
why would the same conclusion not apply to people who move 
to Puerto Rico?253 Indeed, given that the right to travel within 
the United States is more potent than the right to travel 
outside of it, why would people who move to Puerto Rico not 
have a greater protection against being forced to choose 
between these two rights?254 
Congress's notion in passing OCVRA was that 
expatriate citizens have a constitutional right to vote, and they 
retain an interest in the policies and practices of the federal 
government. Once again, though, there are millions of U.S. 
citizens in Puerto Rico living under the same Constitution. 
They too have an interest in the workings of the federal 
government (indeed, a greater interest, given that they live in 
the United States).2ss 
The reason that none of this mattered to the Igartua 
court was that only states (and D.C.) participate in presidential 
elections.256 Similarly, only states participate in congressional 
elections (here excluding D.C. along with the territories). This 
has been the case for as long as the United States has 
contained territories. But again, if Puerto Ricans lose any claim 
to vote because they are not residents of a state, why would the 
same not be the case for permanent expatriates?257 
The relevant lesson from Igartua is not that it is 
unconstitutional for UOCA VA to fail to enfranchise people who 
move to the territories; the court specifically rejected that notion. 
Rather, it is that if Congress's justification for passing OCVRA 
were correct, then citizens of Puerto Rico would have a right to 
vote for President and Congress. Presuming that the First Circuit 
is correct that citizens of Puerto Rico do not have such rights-
that there is no constitutional violation here-then it follows 
252 See supra Section II.A.l. 
253 Gura, supra note 6, at 196. 
254 See Amber L. Cottle, Comment, Silent Citizens: United States Territorial 
Residents and the Right to Vote in Presidential Elections, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 315, 
334 (1995). 
255 See Gura, supra note 6, at 196. 
256 Igartua, 32 F.3d at 9·10. 
257 Gura, supra note 6, at 196. 
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logically that Congress lacked the authority to enfranchise 
permanent expatriates under OCVRA and UOCAV A.258 
This point is made even more clearly in the Second 
Circuit case of Romeu u. Cohen. The facts were similar to those 
in Igartua; a citizen· of New York moved to Puerto Rico and 
attempted to vote in a presidential election via New York. 259 
The Second Circuit, like the First, rejected the claim that 
UOCAVA needed to treat expatriates and territorial residents 
equally and concluded that the source of Romeu's grievance 
was Puerto Rico's status as a territory rather than anything 
UOCA VA had done. The same, the court said, was true of all 
expatriates before UOCAVA (or more precisely, before 
OCVRA).260 But that's just it: OCVRA was not responding to a 
constitutional violation. As the court put it, 
New York's failure to offer Romeu the opportunity to continue to vote 
in its elections after his taking up residence in Puerto Rico no more 
violated his right to travel than did New York's failure under the 
pre-UOCAVA law to offer continued voting rights to its citizens who 
moved to France. 261 
In other words, if residents of the territories can be deprived of 
the right to vote-and the courts have made clear that they 
can-then the principal basis for Congress's power to pass 
OCVRA and UOCAVA crumbles. Indeed, Judge Walker, 
concurring in the judgment, concluded in a footnote ·that 
"UOCAVA's directive to the states to extend the franchise in 
federal elections to nonresident U.S. citizens living overseas 
appears constitutionally infirm."262 Although mere dicta, and 
despite being limited to presidential elections, Judge Walker's 
footnote got it right, and his favorable statement stands as the 
only expression of judicial opinion on the issues in this article. 
258 To be sure, this still leaves the equal protection argument supporting 
Congress's authority to pass OCVRA. See supra text accompanying notes 127-144. 
259 Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d 118, 120-22 (2d Cir. 2001). 
2so Id. at 126. 
261 Jd. 
262 Id. at 134 n.7 (Walker, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Judge Leva), in an 
opinion he wrote on his own behalf and appended to his opinion for the court, argued 
that if UOCAVA is valid Congress could use the same power to legislate presidential 
voting rights for residents of the territories. Leva) suggested that each state could take 
a pro rata share of the territorial votes. ld. at 129-30 (Leva), J., concurring). Judge 
Walker disagreed at length with Leval's argument; his footnote was written to point 
out that the same reasons that Leval's proposal would exceed Congress's authority 
applied to UOCAVA as well. See id. at 131-36, 134 n.7 (Walker, J., concurring). 
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5. The Supplemental Case Against OCVRA and 
UOCA VA in Sum 
495 
The constitutional case against OCVRA and UOCAVA has 
only gotten stronger since 1975. When one considers the way that 
UOCAVA violates the symmetry requirement, runs afoul of the 
Supreme Court's congruent and proportional requirement, 
muddles congressional apportionment, and-worst of all-lays 
bare the absurd third-class treatment of U.S. citizens living in the 
territories, it is even clearer that UOCAVA's enfranchisement of 
permanent expatriates is unconstitutional. 
C. Presidential Elections 
So far, this part of the article has relied on constitutional 
provisions that apply to congressional elections; presidential voting 
is somewhat divergent. Even critics of OCVRA's constitutionality 
seemed more comfortable with the idea of expatriates voting only 
for President.263 The distinct issues surrounding presidential voting 
thus merit some independent attention.26.i 
Presidential voting is not subject to the same restrictions 
on the electorate as congressional voting. It is constitutionally 
problematic to have a state's nonresidents vote in congressional 
elections and for them to not qualify to vote for state house, and 
these problems exist regardless of whether a state freely chooses 
to do so or is forced by Congress. With presidential voting, 
however, the states have much more leeway to select their 
electorate, and it is probably constitutional for them to let former 
residents who cannot vote elsewhere participate in their 
presidential elections. Indeed, many states allow certain 
nonresidents to vote in presidential elections even beyond what 
UOCAVA requires.265 As a matter of policy, moreover, it is less 
problematic for nonresidents to vote for a national officer like the 
President than for someone representing only a particular place 
as representatives and senators do.266 Ultimately, then, the 
biggest issue is one of federalism; it is constitutionally 
problematic for Congress to force states to let nonresidents vote in 
presidential elections. 
263 See supra text accompanying note 43. 
264 See Charles E. Wiggins, Overseas Citizens and the Right to Vote: An 
Introduction, 1 INT'L SCH. L. REV. 128, 129 n.7 (1976). 
265 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
266 See House Hearings, supra note 18, at 260 (statement of Mary C. Lawton, 
Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.). 
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The Electoral College chooses the President. Its members 
are selected by "[e]ach state ... in such Manner as the 
Legislature thereof may direct."267 The strength of the states' 
power is manifest in the counterintuitive notion that citizens do 
not actually have a right to vote for President unless their state 
has chosen to use popular voting. 2ss Of course, every state 
currently uses popular voting and is subject to the constitutional 
rules against discrimination,269 but states can and do choose 
different rules at the margins for things like letting felons vote 
or defining residency.z7o 
The Constitution gives the federal government a role in 
presidential elections, but that role is a limited one.271 Congress 
can select Election Day and the day that the Electoral College 
convenes.272 Congress counts the electoral votes and, if and only 
if no one wins a majority of them, the House chooses the 
President.273 Congress can also legislate to enforce the 
Constitution's antidiscrimination provisions and other rights 
against the states.274 But everything else is left to the states-
the Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase "in such Manner 
as the Legislature [of each state] may direct" as weighing very 
heavily on the state side of the federalism balance.275 
UOCA VA would only be constitutional if it could fit into 
one of these specific congressional bases of power. The only 
potential one has already been discussed: Congress's power under 
267 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
268 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (''The individual citizen has no 
federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the United States unless 
and until the state legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its 
power to appoint members of the electoral college.'); Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 62 
(statement of Mary C. Lawton, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.). But see Peter M. Shane, 
Disappearing Democracy: How Bush v. Gore Undermined the Federal Right to Vote for 
Presidential Electors, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 535, 535 (2001) (rejecting Bush u. Gore on this 
point, scathingly, as "wrong" and "oblivious[) to the values of democracy'). 
269 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1; id. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI; cf id. 
amend. XIV, § 2 (penalizing states that restrict voter eligibility). 
21o See John M. Greabe, A Federal Baseline for the Right to Vote, 112 COLUM. 
L. REV. SIDEBAR 62, 63 (2012). 
271 See Gura, supra note 6, at 202. 
272 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (''The Congress may determine the Time of 
chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall 
be the same throughout the United States."). States can and have chosen different days 
on which to select their electors (most recently by allowing early voting), but this is 
only because Congress has not required otherwise; Congress has preemptive power 
over Election Day but not exclusive power. 
273 See id. amend. XII. The Senate is charged with choosing the Vice President 
if no candidate for that office wins a majority. Id. 
274 See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
275 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (citing McPherson v. Blacker, 
146 u.s. 1, 35 (1892)). 
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Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The right to travel does 
not justify federal action here any more than it did for 
congressional voting.276 The right to vote is not precisely the same 
for presidential and congressional voting, but in neither instance 
does it justify UOCA VA. For presidential voting, as noted above, 
there is not really a right to vote in the first place,277 but to the 
extent that states choose to allocate their electoral votes by 
popular vote, they have to be fair about determining who 
participates and who does not. Congress would have to argue that 
once a state gives citizens a right to participate in presidential 
elections, it cannot constitutionally strip them of their vote when 
they permanently relocate overseas. But why not? The Supreme 
Court's language about states being allowed to impose bona fide 
residency requirements applies with the same force here as it 
does to congressional elections.27B Moreover, if the right to vote for 
President is somehow permanent once it is granted, then the 
cases brought by people seeking to vote for President after moving 
to the territories should not have all failed.279 
The version of Congress's Section 5 authority articulated 
(although not clearly) in Oregon v. Mitchell would be no more 
availing for presidential voting than it was for congressional 
voting.2B0 Once again, Mitchell dealt with the right to travel 
within the United States-the constitutional right of new arrivals 
in a state to be treated the same as older residents-rather than 
the more limited right to live abroad that is an issue with 
UOCAV A. And here too, Mitchell only approved an 
administrative fix at the margins of residency requirements, 
while UOCAVA essentially guts residency requirements. 
This leaves one last argument. When states (as they did 
before OCVRA) allowed public expatriates-but not private 
expatriates-to vote for President, they violated the private 
expatriates' equal protection rights and opened the door for 
Congress to respond. As with congressional elections, this is 
probably the strongest argument supporting federal action. Once 
again, however, there are good arguments that there is no equal 
protection violation and that, even if there is, UOCAVA is 
probably not a congruent and proportional remedy.2s1 Congress 
could tread more lightly on the delicate federalist structure by 
276 See supra text accompanying notes 115-125. 
211 See supra text accompanying note 268. 
278 See supra text accompanying notes 123-125. 
279 See supra Section II.B.4. 
2so See supra Section II.A.2.c. 
281 See supra Section II.A.2.b.iii. 
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simply requiring states to treat equally all former residents who 
are not elsewhere voting for President-letting either all or none 
of them vote (or perhaps making other distinctions, but not ones 
based on the identity of one's employer).2s2 
It is unconstitutional for UOCAVA to force states to let 
permanent expatriates vote in presidential and congressional 
elections. The constitutional case against UOCA VA is 
overwhelming; nevertheless, UOCAV A's enfranchisement of 
permanent expatriates remains in force. The next part of this 
article considers why. 
III. WHY UOCA VA PERSISTS 
Given the constitutional questions surrounding OCVRA 
and UOCA VA, one would think that the legislation would have 
been challenged in court. For nearly 40 years, however, no such 
case has been brought. This is principally because there is a 
limited number of plaintiffs with the ability to sue, and because 
those plaintiffs would find it difficult as a political matter to 
fight for the disenfranchisement of millions of voters. With the 
passage of time, the chances-both of a challenge and of a court 
responding favorably to one-have only dimmed as these 
millions of voters have grown accustomed to their right to vote. 
A. Who Would Sue? 
Any lawsuit first requires a plaintiff motivated to file it and 
with standing to sue. For UOCAVA, those two requirements seem 
to be a big part of the reason why there has been no litigation. 
1. Individuals 
Someone who has had his or her right to vote stripped 
by a law could easily challenge that law; both the motivation 
and the standing to sue are obvious. A law that grants someone 
the right to vote, by contrast, offers no such obvious voter-
plaintiffs. Those who benefit from the law would certainly not 
want to challenge it. Those who wish to benefit from it but are 
shut out-residents of the territories-have attempted to 
challenge their exclusion from UOCA VA's coverage but have 
not challenged anyone else's inclusion.2s3 
282 See supra text accompanying notes 127-144. 
283 See supra Section II.B.4. 
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Resident-voters would have a hard time establishing 
standing. Among the requirements of standing is a showing that 
the plaintiff has suffered an injury because of the contested 
conduct.284 It would be challenging for a resident-voter to 
establish such an injury from UOCAVA's enfranchisement of 
permanent expatriates. The fact that the enfranchisement is 
unconstitutional is not good enough; anyone could make that 
claim, and such generalized grievances do not qualify as injuries 
for standing purposes.2s5 
The best hope for an individual voter to establish standing 
to challenge UOCAVA's enfranchisement of permanent 
expatriates would be for those living in a district to complain that 
the enfranchisement improperly dilutes their legitimate votes.286 
To take a much simpler and more extreme hypothetical as an 
analogy, if the State of Michigan decided that its U.S. senators 
were going to be elected jointly by the people of Michigan and 
Ontario, it would seem likely that I, a citizen of Michigan, would 
have a good argument that my own vote had been illegitimately 
diluted. But UOCAVA's effects are two or three orders of 
magnitude less dramatic than in this hypothetical.287 Moreover, 
the standards for a citizen to establish standing for such a 
dilution claim are unclear. 
Candidates wishing to sue might need to file lawsuits after 
an election for the claims to be ripe. But after the election, the 
candidate-plaintiff would have a hard time establishing an injury 
unless he or she could show that UOCAVA swung the election 
result. To be sure, there have been multiple elections in which the 
margin of victory was a mere fraction of the number of UOCAVA 
votes, so overseas voters may have swung the election.28B 
28< See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
285 See id. at 575. 
286 See supra text accompanying notes 237-241 (discussing sense in which 
dilution is used in this article). 
287 In the 2012 presidential election, Michigan saw only 12,916 UOCAVA 
ballots, and only some of those were from permanent expatriates. See U.S. ELECTION 
ASSISTANCE COMM'N, supra note 11, at 17. Ontarians cast over 4.8 million ballots in 
the 2014 Canadian general election. See Diana Mehta, Ontario Reverses 20- Year 
Decline in Voter Turnout, TORONTO STAR, June 14, 2014, at A14. 
288 See KLEKOWSKI VON KOPPENFELS, supra note 10, at 218 (listing two such 
senatorial elections in 2008: Minnesota with a margin of 312 and 12,091 UOCAVA votes, 
and Alaska with a margin of 3,953 and 12,103 UOCAVA votes). This is harder to show for 
House elections given that UOCAVA records are generally kept by county rather than by 
congressional district. Still, it seems likely that numerous House elections would have 
seen a number of UOCAVA votes many times the margin of victory. The closest House 
elections in recent years have been: 2014, Arizona's Second District (161 votes, 0.1%); 
2012, North Carolina's Seventh District (654 votes, 0.2%); 2010, and Illinois's Eighth 
District (290 votes, 0.1%). See United States House of Representatives Elections, 2014, 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections,_ 
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Overseas voters definitely swung the 2000 presidential election; 
George W. Bush could not have won without Florida, and he could 
not have won Florida without his advantage among overseas 
voters-especially those in the military.zs9 That highlights a 
weakness in this argument, though: most UOCAVA voters are 
affiliated with the military.290 The bulk of these votes, in other 
words, are votes that the states would have counted even without 
OCVRA and UOCAVA's mandate.291 Thus it is one thing to say 
that UOCAV A ballots swung the election; it is quite another to 
say that UOCA VA itself swung the election. This presents a 
formidable barrier to any candidate who might wish to challenge 
UOCAVA in court. 
There are also political considerations. There were 
plenty of lawsuits in Florida concerning the 2000 presidential 
election, including one regarding the proper standards for 
counting overseas ballots. 292 But it would have been 
uncomfortable to reverse the election result on the basis of a 
constitutional objection that (1) was made after the fact and (2) 
required disenfranchising so many voters, including so many in 
the military. Al Gore-who as a losing candidate had a much 
stronger case for standing than any individual voter would 
have had-recognized one particular aspect of this when he 
later explained why he did not want to win the election by 
getting questionable overseas military ballots thrown out: "I 
would be hounded by Republicans and the press every day of 
my presidency and it wouldn't be worth having."293 
2014 [http://perma.cc/79Y6-SDKT) (last visited Feb. 29, 2016); United States House of 
Representatives Elections, 2012, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/United_States_ 
House_ of_Representatives_elections,_2012 [http://perma.cc/B8R9-LCXG] (last visited 
Feb. 29, 2016); United States House of Representatives Elections in Illinois, 2010, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Illinois 
,_2010 [http://perma.cc/9FKU-348M] (last visited Feb. 29, 2016); cf. S. REP. No. 90-1025, 
at 6 (1968) (individual views of Sen. Curtis) (noting, in report on bill expanding overseas 
voting, "the many extremely close elections that can be decided by the mail vote"). 
289 See David Barstow & Don VanNatta Jr., How Bush Took Florida: Mining 
the Overseas Absentee Vote, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, at 1. AI Gore's supporters also 
briefly entertained the notion that a wave of UOCAV A votes from Israel would put 
Gore over the top in Florida. See Gura, supra note 6, at 181-84. 
290 See U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM'N, supra note 11, at 8. 
291 See supra text accompanying note 30 (noting states' pre-OCVRA practice of 
allowing absent military and other public employees, and their dependents, to vote). 
292 See Bush v. Hillsborough Cty. Canvassing Bd., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1314-
17 (N.D. Fla. 2000). 
293 Barstow & Van Natta, supra note 289. History does not record whether 
Gore still felt that way eight years later. Cf. Diane H. Mazur, The Bullying of America: 
A Cautionary Tale About Military Voting and Civil-Military Relations, 4 ELECTION L.J. 
105, 105 (2005) (describing how "accusations of disloyalty to the military were used to 
bully county election officials into disregarding election rules and accepting non-
complying ballots"). 
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Thus, properly timing a lawsuit to challenge UOCAVA 
would be difficult. Filed before an actual election, it might be 
hard for a candidate-plaintiff to establish standing and 
ripeness. 294 Filed after an election, it would require the unlikely 
showing that UOCA VA affected the result, and it then would 
require the heavy-handed remedy of reversing that result by 
throwing out votes already cast and counted. 
2. States 
States would face a much simpler path toward 
establishing standing in a challenge to UOCA VA. They would not 
face the same challenges as voters and candidates of establishing 
standing and proper timing. Because the law regulates states 
directly and requires them to do a myriad of things to facilitate 
overseas-voter registration and voting, states would have the 
ability to challenge the law at almost any time.zgs 
When OCVRA was enacted in 1975, it was widely 
assumed that state plaintiffs would immediately challenge it, 
just as they had done to the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 
1970 in Oregon v. Mitchell. 296 It is not immediately obvious why 
no state officials lived up to this expectation. Perhaps they, like 
Congress, assumed that after the Supreme Court decided 
Mitchell, the Court was likely to read congressional power 
broadly. Challenging OCVRA might therefore have seemed like 
a waste of limited resources. Still, it is somewhat surprising 
that there would have been unanimity on this point; one might 
have expected at least one state to want to challenge the law. 
The states' reluctance to challenge OCVRA (and later, 
UOCAVA) is even more surprising when one considers the cases in 
which the federal government has sued states for violating 
UOCAV A.297 These cases provide an opening for states to defend 
themselves by challenging the constitutionality of the statute itself. 
And yet it has not happened. One possible reason is that, 
historically, once voting rights are granted, they tend to remain. 
294 Cf. Somers v. S.C. State Election Comm'n, 871 F. Supp. 2d 490, 498 (D.S.C. 
2012) (fmding no standing for candidate challenging state's implementation of UOCAVA). 
295 States might also, as a general matter, face a lower bar for establishing 
standing. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518-20 (2007). 
296 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
297 See, e.g., United States v. Georgia, 952 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (N.D. Ga. 2013); 
United States v. Alabama, 857 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (M.D. Ala. 2012); United States v. 
New York, No. 1:10-CV-1214, 2012 WL 254263 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2012); United States 
v. Cunningham, No. 3:08CV709, 2009 WL 3350028 (E.D. Va. Oct. 15, 2009). 
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There are exceptions,298 but as a general matter, once people are 
enfranchised, they have a voice that they can raise to stay 
enfranchised. It was difficult for permanent expatriates to get 
representation, but once they did, they constituted a large force 
that would, presumably, fight to keep that representation. Of 
course, domestic voters vastly outnumber permanent-expatriate 
voters, but as a matter of general policy-setting aside the 
constitutional issues, that is-domestic voters have not shown a 
substantial sentiment against letting their permanent-expatriate 
associates participate. It is the way of politics that nothing 
happens simply because it is a good idea. Rather, things happen 
because politically powerful constituencies demand that they 
happen. With no one at the state level flexing any political muscle 
against UOCA VA, states simply lack the incentive to litigate 
against the statute. 
The structure and history of OCVRA's extension of voting 
rights also likely promotes the states' reluctance to litigate. Before 
OCVRA, every state already allowed members of the military and 
other federal employees stationed overseas to vote based on their 
prior residence in the state. Military voters are a sympathetic 
group. 299 OCVRA forced states to treat private expatriates the 
same as public ones; conversely, many of the constitutional 
arguments against OCVRA and UOCA VA apply with equal force 
to both groups. By tying the two groups' voting rights together, 
OCVRA made it difficult for a state to litigate in favor of 
disenfranchising only one of them. The equal protection argument 
for UOCAVA (the notion that Congress can force states to treat 
the two categories of permanent expatriates equally) is the 
toughest one for opponents to win.300 One potent argument for 
opponents was that while OCVRA required states to allow both 
groups of permanent expatriates to vote, that remedy was too 
strong because Congress could obtain equality by allowing neither 
group to vote. To make that argument, though, states would 
essentially need to argue in favor of disenfranchising some military 
voters, and it is unlikely that any state would want to do that. 
29B The most notable is the disenfranchisement of black men in the South after 
Reconstruction. See RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 
ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 36 (2001) (discussing the ratchet effect 
of enfranchisement and the exception represented by Reconstruction). Another 
example is the termination of voting rights for noncitizen immigrants in the surprising 
number of states that had enfranchised them. See generally Jamin B. Raskin, Legal 
Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien 
Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391 (1993). 
299 See supra text accompanying notes 292-293. 
300 See supra Section II.A.2.b.iii. 
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The military's politically exalted position also helps to 
explain why states have not used UOCAVA's unconstitutionality 
as a defense when the federal government sues them for violating 
it. The federal cases have generally concerned states' proper 
processing of overseas ballots, especially military ballots.3°1 If 
states cannot defend their processing and instead challenge the 
federal government's underlying authority, it would again entail 
arguing for the disenfranchisement of military voters. If states 
were to argue in the litigation that they want to let overseas 
military voters participate, just not to have the federal government 
force them to do so, then they would still face the (politically 
damaging) argument that they were not adequately facilitating 
military participation. Arguing that UOCAVA is invalid would 
not help the states' litigating position as much as it might seem. 
The final reason why the failure to challenge UOCAVA is 
not surprising is that so much time has passed without any 
litigation. Despite the core point of constitutionalism that statutes 
must always bow to the superior authority of the Constitution, 
the practical reality is that the Constitution is less potent when 
pitted against a lengthy, unbroken practice. Moreover, the longer 
that people have voted, the more an affront it is to seek to 
disenfranchise them. If permanent expatriates have been voting 
for 40 years and the Republic has survived, doomsday scenarios 
about their enfranchisement become that much less compelling. 
In a more mundane sense, if states have been able to 
stomach 40 years of nonresidents voting in their federal 
elections, it is hard to see what would make states sue now. 
Indeed, many states have apparently warmed to the practice 
and gone above and beyond it. 302 This liberal expansion might 
even suggest that if UOCAVA is ever struck down, some states 
would not disenfranchise everyone that they could. But unless 
there is a lawsuit in the future, we will never know. 
3. The Future 
Neither individuals nor states have challenged OCVRA or 
UOCAVA, and until the current landscape changes dramatically, 
they never will. But dramatic changes are not impossible. The 
overseas population could increase to the point where the effect of 
its votes is no longer so negligible. Relatedly, voting technology 
could improve and make it easier for overseas voters to 
301 See supra note 297. 
3°2 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. 
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participate; this could both raise their numbers and reduce the 
need for (and states' tolerance of) intrusive federal regulation. 
Constitutional reform could be another source of change. If the 
nation switches its mode of electing presidents to a national 
popular vote, there might not be any need to force states to let 
their former residents vote for President.3°3 
Finally, UOCA VA could become more vulnerable to legal 
challenges if the political landscape changes. Currently, the 
population of overseas voters seems to include plenty of both 
Republicans and Democrats, although no one knows for sure.3o4 
If this balance changed dramatically-say, because of a sizable 
reduction in the nation's overseas military presence3o5-<>ne side 
or the other might perceive a political advantage in "clarifying" 
the constitutional issues here. All of that said, UOCAVA seems 
safe from litigation for the time being. 
B. Implications 
Many commentators argue that when considering 
legislation, Congress should take constitutional arguments 
more seriously instead of focusing solely on policy and politics 
while leaving the Constitution to the courts.3os Unfortunately, 
constitutional objections to a legislative proposal are generally 
viewed as an obstruction-an obstacle that the legislation's 
proponents must overcome rather than a valid area for them to 
consider and debate.3o7 
Thus, it is interesting to juxtapose the unlikelihood that 
permanent expatriates' enfranchisement will be litigated with 
Congress's assumption when it passed OCVRA that litigation was 
303 See infra Section IV. C. 
304 See KLEKOWSKI VON KOPPENFELS, supra note 10, at 195. 
305 See id. (noting conventional wisdom that the military favors Republicans). 
306 See Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coardinacy in State 
and Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 657·58 (2000) (describing 
academic consensus that nonjudicial branches have a duty to interpret the Constitution); see 
also Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 59 (testimony of Mary C. Lawton, Deputy Assistant 
Att'y Gen.). Because the problem here is not structural barriers to standing so much as it is 
the lack of a political will to sue, this article will not offer many general suggestions about 
how courts might want to treat legal challenges to statutes like UOCAVA differently. One 
general point seems evident, though: courts should consider the reasons for the lack of 
litigation before attributing any significance to the decades· long practice of overseas voting 
that UOCAVA represents. 
307 For an example of this sentiment in the OCVRA debate, see Transcript on 
S. 95, supra note 47, at 65 (comments of Rep. Dent) (stating that "if we were to defeat 
in committee every bill that someone questions our right on the basis of the 
Constitution, there would not be too darned many bills passed''). 
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inevitable.3os If Congress had known in 1975 what is now 
apparent about the lack of litigation, one wonders what the effect 
would have been. Some proponents might have been untroubled, 
reasoning that it was a point in the law's favor that no one would 
be interested in challenging it. Others might have dialed back 
their deference and been less willing to vote for the law without a 
legitimate constitutional discussion in Congress. The law's 
opponents certainly would have fought harder, knowing that this 
was their last chance to stand up for the Constitution. Perhaps, 
then, there would have been a more earnest and complete debate 
of the constitutional issues. Maybe OCVRA's proponents would 
have carried the day, maybe the opponents would have won, or 
maybe a scaled-back version of OCVRA would have passed. 
Congress could have limited the law to presidential voting,309 to 
reqmrmg equal treatment between private and public 
expatriates, to enfranchising only those who might have had an 
intention to return to the states someday,310 or to some other 
creative accommodation. 
More generally, the combination of the grave constitutional 
concerns surrounding OCVRA and UOCA VA with the continuing 
lack of litigation-UOCAVA's status as "unconstitutional but 
entrenched"-suggests that those who oppose proposed legislation 
on constitutional grounds should not give up so easily. Their 
opponents' argument-that the courts will sort out constitutional 
issues, so Congress need not-is unfortunately a popular one, but 
it should not be allowed to carry the day. 
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO UOCAV A's CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROBLEMS 
UOCAVA's enfranchisement of permanent expatriates is 
unconstitutional, but it is firmly entrenched. Joining those who 
tried to prevent OCVRA's enactment, this article supports the 
inclusion of permanent expatriates in American civic life as a 
matter of policy but calls for more respect for the proper 
constitutional bounds. This part offers several solutions-some 
simple, others more ambitious-that would alleviate the 
3os See supra text accompanying notes 46·51. 
309 See supra text accompanying note 43. 
310 &e supra note 104 (noting constitutional doubts from an OCVRA proponent 
about extending voting rights to permanent expatriates). Even the broadest reading of the 
previous voting·rights expansion, the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, required an 
intention to return. &e Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 175 (pamphlet from Chamber of 
Commerce) (characterizing Senator Goldwater's view of the 1970 law). 
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constitutional problems while still promoting permanent 
expatriates' civic participation. The simplest solution would be to 
give states a choice to allow former residents to vote, though this 
would not solve all of UOCAVA's constitutional problems. A more 
complicated solution would be to route permanent expatriates' 
votes through Washington, D.C., rather than their former states, 
though this suffers from several limitations. The best solution 
would be to harness the movement for a national popular vote for 
President and use that as an opening to provide meaningful 
· voting rights not just for permanent expatriates but also for 
citizens of U.S. territories. In the end, a constitutional 
amendment is probably the optimal approach, however remote a 
possibility it may be. 
A. The Persuasion Solution 
One solution would be to replace UOCAVA's requirements 
regarding permanent expatriates with suggestions; Congress 
could allow states to choose whether to allow permanent 
expatriates to vote as though they still lived at their last stateside 
address. This is similar to what Congress did for 20 years before 
OCVRA was enacted, specifically because of congressional 
sensitivity to constitutional constraints.311 
There is good reason to believe that the states would be 
receptive to this solution. The law that OCVRA replaced did not 
force states to do anything vis-a-vis voting rights for their former 
residents. It merely encouraged states to allow certain people to 
participate. States responded positively to this encouragement as 
far as public expatriates were concerned, and while the states 
responded less positively with regard to private expatriates, they 
would almost certainly be more receptive today.312 Moreover, for 
the same reasons that states have not challenged UOCAVA in 
court, they would likely want to maintain the status quo and 
avoid widespread disenfranchisement. 
If Congress were worried about any states refusing, it 
could back up the suggestions with some inducements. States 
could be required to have broad participation if, for instance, 
they want to be eligible for federal grants under the Help 
311 See supra text accompanying notes 27-36. 
312 See supra text accompanying notes 30-33. The states have been letting these 
private expatriates participate for almost 40 years now without much of a fuss, and most 
states have chosen to go above and beyond UOCAVA's requirements-to some extent 
after being encouraged to do so by the federal government. See supra note 55. 
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America Vote Act.313 By relying on its powers under the 
Spending Clause, instead of Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Congress could avoid much of UOCAVA's current 
constitutional infirmity. 
Giving the states a choice in the matter would not take 
care of all the constitutional problems, though. For congressional 
elections, there are still the issues of the People of the States 
Clauses and the symmetry requirement. But if states themselves 
are voluntarily including permanent expatriates who used to live 
there, it makes it somewhat easier to argue that those expatriates 
are "people of the state."314 That being said, it is still something of 
a stretch to say that a nonresident is a person of the state.315 
Relatedly, it would still be odd for a state to allow people to vote 
who are not included in the state's congressional-apportionment 
population.316 But both of these problems already exist in those 
states that have expanded their federal electorate beyond what 
UOCAVA requires. 317 The point is not that this is okay, but rather 
that the problem already exists, and making UOCA VA optional 
would not add some new dimension to it. 
As for the symmetry requirement, states would be able 
to avoid the problem by granting their expatriate voters the 
ability to vote in state-house elections (as some states already 
do). 318 Again, giving the states a choice in the matter would not 
313 Cf. THOMAS, supra note 215, at 9 (noting potential use of the Spending 
Clause to extend congressional power over procedures (as opposed to voter 
qualifications) in federal elections). 
314 The Fourteenth Amendment states that any U.S. citizen residing in a state 
is a citizen of that state. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. But while residence is a 
sufficient condition of citizenship, that does not make it a necessary one. Cf Davidson, 
supra note 73, at 481 (arguing that state citizens who go overseas, as opposed to going 
to another state, retain citizenship in their previous state). 
315 Once states were freed from UOCAVA's shackles, they could adopt different 
formulas for permanent-expatriate participation. For instance, instead of granting the 
franchise to those whose last stateside address was in that state, they could use other 
standards in an attempt to include voters with a stronger connection to the state, such as 
those whose last meaningful address was in that state, those who had lived in that state 
longer than in any other, those who intended to move back to that state when they 
returned to the United States, those who had immediate family in that state, or (perhaps 
most controversially) those who were willing to pay that state a fee for the privilege. To 
the extent that states varied in their approaches, they would need to exclude those who 
chose to participate in another state. If it were using inducements here, Congress could 
reduce the burden by requiring states to use the current ("last state") eligibility formula 
as one of its conditions. Alternatively, Congress could assist in the administration of 
overseas voters' registration in a way that would force voters to choose one and only one 
state. This all seems messier than the current regime, though. 
316 See supra Section II.B.3. 
317 See supra text accompanying notes 54-55. 
3 18 See supra notes 174-175 and accompanying text (describing symmetry 
requirement); supra note 54 (describing state practices). 
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necessarily solve the problem, but neither would it worsen the 
status quo or foreclose a solution. 
Whatever the benefits and problems of legislation of the 
sort discussed in this section, it is hard to imagine Congress 
acting to change a provision of the law that has operated 
successfully for 40 years, has not been questioned in court, and 
has no powerful constituency seeking to alter it. In the decades 
since OCVRA first enfranchised permanent expatriates, 
Congress has passed multiple updates to the law.319 None of the 
updates have been in response to the constitutional problems; 
all of them have been intended to further facilitate overseas 
voting and thus to answer the same political demands and 
serve the same democratic interests that motivated OCVRA in 
the first place. If Congress is going to pass legislation remotely 
resembling the proposals discussed in this subsection, it will 
almost certainly be by necessity-in response to litigation that 
successfully challenges UOCAV A. In other words, it is unlikely 
to happen anytime soon. 
B. The D. C. Solution 
Another, more radical solution to UOCAVA's 
constitutional problems is for Congress to take the states out of 
the business of permanent-expatriate voting. Under this plan, 
UOCA VA would still cover overseas absentee voting by bona fide 
residents of states and might even restrict states' excessively 
stringent residence requirements, but those citizens who do not 
even purport to be residents of a state would not be able to 
continue voting there. Instead, they would participate in a new 
form of federal voting, effectively limited to presidential elections. 
Being a more radical plan, this still suffers from the fact that 
Congress has no current motivation to change UOCAV A. As 
discussed below, though, events in related spheres could tee up 
this issue and make it more conceivable that Congress would get 
it on the agenda. 
This removal of permanent-expatriate voting from the 
states' purview would clear up more of UOCAVA's constitutional 
problems. Because only bona fide residents (overseas temporarily) 
would be voting in congressional elections, this would avoid the 
constitutional problems associated with voters who were not 
really "people of the states" and who are not eligible to vote for 
319 See supra note 21. 
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state house.320 It would mitigate the problem of unequal 
treatment for residents of the territories,321 because permanent 
expatriates would no longer be able to vote in congressional 
elections. (Their continued ability to vote in presidential elections 
would still present a problem in the territories, but no larger a 
problem than the one presented currently by D.C. residents' right 
to vote for President.) 
Given that presidential voting is pretty firmly under 
state control, there is only one way under the current system for 
the federal government to take over presidential voting by 
permanent expatriates. Under the Twenty-Third Amendment, 
Washington, D.C., gets to cast electoral votes for President, with 
Congress given the same power to choose the method of 
allocation that states are given over theirs.azz Because Congress 
has this power, it would be very easy (as a constitutional matter, 
if not as a political one) for Congress to declare that permanent 
expatriates have Washington, D.C., as their "voting residence" 
and to allocate one of D.C.'s three electoral votes to those 
expatriates.aza It makes a certain sort of sense to link permanent 
expatriates officially to one particular place in the United States 
and to have D.C. be that place; a similar plan was floated when 
OCVRA was being considered.az4 
There are two obvious flaws with this plan. The first is 
that it would dilute the presidential voting power of current 
320 One possible variation would take into account those states that 
voluntarily allow permanent expatriates to vote (including for state house), and apply 
the D.C. solution only to those for whom no such state is available. 
321 See supra Section II.B.4. 
322 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII. 
323 The constitutional problems with OCVRA's "voting residence" concept include 
the fact that Article I, Section 2 restricts congressional voting to people of the respective 
states, so that defining a nonresident as a person of the state for the sole purpose of voting is 
a troubling bootstrap, and that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not give the 
federal government the authority to usurp the states' power to choose their own bona fide 
definitions of residence. These are not problems in D.C., though; it has no voting 
representation in Congress, and given the federal government's plenary power over the 
district, federalism is not at issue either. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (giving the federal 
government exclusive authority over the seat of government). 
324 See, e.g., Hearings on Representation of the District of Columbia, supra 
note 120, at 19 (comments of Rep. Butler) (raising idea in the context of a 
constitutional amendment to give D.C. voting members of the House and Senate); 
House Hearings, supra note 18, at 259 (comments of Rep. Butler and Mary C. Lawton, 
Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.) (broaching possibility of letting all overseas voters vote in 
D.C.); id. at 193 (results of survey of Americans overseas) (suggesting using D.C. as 
expatriates' voting residence); see also Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 70 (statement 
of Sargent Shriver, Chairman, Ambassadors Comm. for Voting by Americans Overseas) 
(noting that expatriates see themselves as Americans rather than as citizens of a 
particular state). 
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D.C. residents. 325 The Twenty-Third Amendment caps D.C.'s 
electoral votes at whatever number the least populous state 
has, which has always been three. 326 This cap shortchanged 
D.C. between the 1961 passage of the amendment and 1980, 
because D.C. had a large enough population in the 1960 and 
1970 Censuses to qualify for four electoral votes had it been 
measured as a state.327 This was not the case after 1980, 
though, and by the 2010 Census, D.C. had a smaller population 
than six of the seven states that have three electoral votes. 328 
But taking away one of D.C.'s three electoral votes to give to 
permanent expatriates would effectively return D.C.'s residents 
to the underrepresented status they suffered in the Electoral 
College before the 1980 Census. 
It is hard to know just how these numbers cut. While in 
the 2012 presidential election there were roughly twice as 
many UOCAVA votes as total D.C. votes,329 it is unclear how 
many of those UOCA VA voters were permanent expatriates 
with no bona fide stateside residence, as opposed to bona-fide-
but-absentee residents just using UOCAVA's procedures. This 
matters. If the number of permanent-expatriate voters is very 
large, giving them only one electoral vote might reduce their 
current voting power (though the political power of 
concentrating it instead of chopping it up into 51 little parts 
and mixing it in with 51 much larger resident populations 
might compensate for that). But if the number is very small, 
giving them one electoral vote might be far too generous. In the 
latter case, Congress could lump the permanent expatriates in 
with the rest of D.C.'s population rather than give them one 
electoral vote of their own. Of course, some might complain 
325 Cf Hearings on Representation of the District of Columbia, supra note 120, 
at 113, 119-20 (comments of J. Eugene Marans, Counsel, Bipartisan Comm. on 
Absentee Voting) (objecting to idea of a constitutional amendment giving voting rights 
to expatriates via D.C.). 
326 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII. 
327 See DAVE TARR & BOB BENENSON, ELECTIONS A TO Z 719 (4th ed. 2012) 
(detailing historical allocations of electoral votes); U.S. Population by State from 1900, 
DEMOGRAPHIA, http://www.demographia.com/db-state1900.htm [http://perma.cd43MT-
V5WT] (last visited Feb. 29, 2016) (showing states' and D.C.'s population by decade). 
328 See TARR & BENENSON, supra note 327; U.S. Population by State from 
1900, supra note 327; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND CHANGE: 
2000 TO 2010, at 2 (2011), http://www.census.gov/prodlcen2010/briefs/c2010br-Ol.pdf 
[http://perma.cd9JD2-5JQV]. 
329 See supra note 11 (noting about 600,000 UOCAVA ballots); 2012 
Presidential General Election Results-District of Columbia, DAVE LEIP'S ATLAS OF U.S. 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/state.php?year==2012& 
fips==ll&f==l&off==O&elect==O [http://perma.cd3TWX-49D9] (last visited Feb. 29, 2016) 
(noting total of under 300,000 votes cast). 
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about having a nonresident population skewing D.C.'s 
presidential choice in this manner, but that's currently what 
happens (albeit to a lesser degree) in every state and D.C. 
under the current UOCAVA system. 
The second flaw with the plan is that permanent 
expatriates would lose their current UOCAVA-given right to 
vote for House and Senate. 330 While that result would be more 
consistent with the Constitution, it would be politically 
unpalatable. Permanent expatriates vote for House and Senate 
because that's what Congress wanted when it passed OCVRA 
and because that choice has proved popular. 
There are reasons to challenge that choice, though. When 
Americans living in one of the United States interact with the 
government in their daily lives, they deal with a combination of 
state and federal governments and a combination of legislative, 
executive, and judicial branches. When, by contrast, Americans 
permanently move overseas, they deal almost exclusively with the 
federal government-other than when they vote-and first and 
foremost with the executive branch in the form of the State 
Department.331 Sometimes, of course, it can help to have a 
member of Congress in one's corner; congressional constituent-
services offices are an important tool for aiding any American in 
cutting through bureaucratic red tape.332 But Congress's nonvoting 
delegates from D.C. and the territories provide constituent services, 
too.333 There is no reason why the D.C. solution could not 
incorporate a new nonvoting representative in Congress for 
permanent expatriates, and having such a representative 
dedicated solely to their needs would presumably serve 
permanent expatriates better than the current system does.334 
The deficiencies in the D.C. solution are not insignificant, 
though to some extent they highlight some of the status quo's 
330 See KLEKOWSKI VON KOPPENFELS, supra note 10, at 220. 
331 Cf House Hearings, supra note 18, at 192-93 (results of survey of Americans 
overseas) (expressing keen interest in voting for President but significantly less interest in 
voting for Congress); Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 62-63 (testimony of Mary C. 
Lawton, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.) (noting Presidents' representation of the entire 
nation, in contrast to legislators' representation of just their districts). 
332 See Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 67 (testimony of Sargent Shriver, 
Chairman, Ambassadors Comm. for Voting by Americans Overseas). 
333 See, e.g., Constituent Services, CONGRESSWOMAN ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, 
http://norton.house.gov/services [http://perma.cc/PXL3-SVPT] (last visited Feb. 29, 2016) 
(listing constituent services offered by D.C.'s nonvoting representative). 
3
"4 Cf House Hearings, supra note 18, at 193 (results of survey of Americans 
overseas) (advocating for dedicated representation for expatriates); KLEKOWSKI VON 
KOPPENFELS, supra note 10, at 217 (noting 2008's new Democratic presidential 
primary for overseas voters as their own constituency). 
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deficiencies. The D.C. solution would dilute the votes of bona fide 
D.C. residents with those of a bunch of strangers-as UOCAVA 
currently does (to a lesser degree) in every state and 
congressional district. The D.C. solution would deprive 
permanent expatriates of the right to vote in congressional 
elections-and thereby makes them just like current residents of 
D.C. and the territories. This, in turn, highlights again the 
absurdity of UOCAVA's equal protection problem. When 
permanent expatriates say that they should be able to vote for 
House and Senate because they are U.S. citizens, residents of 
D.C. and the territories can note bitterly that they are U.S. 
citizens too, and that they lack voting representatives. If 
permanent expatriates respond by remarking that they used to 
live in a state, the residents of D.C. and the territories can scoff 
that many of them used to live in a state, too. The D.C. solution 
would represent a step backward for permanent expatriates' 
voting rights. But it would preserve permanent expatriates' 
presidential voting rights and could grant them their own, 
dedicated, nonvoting representative in the House. Given that 
their position would be as good as D.C. residents' and better than 
that of residents of the territories, their complaints would be 
much less sympathetic. 
This all highlights the abysmal treatment of the 
residents of D.C. and the territories as third-class citizens. 
When OCVRA passed in 1975, it might have appeared that it 
was part of a wave of enfranchisement. A consistent forward 
march of voting-rights legislation had been enacted since the 
mid-1960s. Some may have assumed that the equal protection 
problems that UOCAVA produced were temporary, just until 
voting rights in D.C. and the territories were upgraded. A D.C. 
statehood amendment was in the air at the time,335 and three 
years later it passed Congress.aas 
That amendment was never ratified, though. 337 While it 
is true that OCVRA and UOCAVA have allowed permanent 
expatriates to vote for 40 years without any adverse practical 
335 See Hearings on Representation of the District of Columbia, supra note 120, 
at 27 (comments of Rep. Butler) (noting simultaneous consideration of OCVRA and 
constitutional amendment to give D.C. voting members in the House and Senate). 
336 H.R.J. Res. 554, 95th Cong. (1978); 124 CONG. REC. 27,260 (1978) (Senate 
passage); id. at 5272-73 (House passage). 
337 See Jonathan Turley, Too Clever By Half: The Unconstitutionality of 
Partial Representation of the District of Columbia in Congress, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
305, 309 (2008) (describing fate of amendment); see also THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS AMENDED; UNRATIFIED AMENDMENTS; ANALYTICAL 
INDEX, H.R. Doc. No. 110-50, at 31 (2007) (text of amendment). 
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effects, it is similarly the case that the same 40 years have seen 
none of the anticipated progress on voting rights for D.C. and 
the territories. There is no great groundswell of public pressure 
to amend UOCA VA and fix its constitutional deficiencies with 
anything like the D.C. solution. But there could yet· be a 
groundswell in favor of doing right by D.C. and the territories, 
an issue that has had no trouble finding space on the 
congressional agenda.33s 
The D.C. solution could be accomplished through 
ordinary legislation, but Congress is unlikely to take any such 
action in a vacuum. When the time comes for U.S. citizens in 
D.C. and the territories to finally get meaningful federal voting 
rights, it will probably entail a constitutional amendment.3a9 
Once amending the Constitution is on the table, it would be 
feasible and sensible to fix UOCAVA at the same time. If 
Congress is really attached to UOCA VA's current mode of 
enfranchising permanent expatriates, it could amend the 
Constitution to retroactively legitimize the .statute. Better yet, 
though, it could create a new federal constituency for 
permanent expatriates-with its own presidential voting and 
perhaps its own voting representatives in Congress-alongside 
similar ones for D.C. and the territories.34o 
C. The Popular Vote Solution 
Another related issue that ranks much higher on the 
agenda than fixing UOCA VA-and thus makes it a potentially 
useful vehicle for fixing UOCAVA-is Electoral College reform, 
a perennial source of proposed constitutional amendments.341 
338 In one ironic example of this, a recent attempt to obtain a voting 
representative for D.C. without amending the Constitution spurred one proponent to 
use UOCAVA as evidence of congressional power in this arena. See Hearing on D.C. 
House Voting Rights Act, supra note 6, at 24-25 (statement of Viet Dinh, former 
Assistant Att'y Gen.); see also id. at 63-64 (statement of Jonathan Turley, Professor of 
Law, George Washington University Law School) (noting and disagreeing with Dinh's 
argument). 
339 See Turley, supra note 337 (making case against applying mere legislative 
fix to D.C.'s lack of representation). 
340 See KLEKOWSKI VON KOPPENFELS, supra note 10, at 220; Shurtz, supra 
note 6, at 155-56; supra note 334 and accompanying text. Puerto Rico, D.C., and the 
permanent-expatriate population are all large enough that each would warrant its own 
representation; the other territories are small enough that they would likely be 
combined into one constituency. 
341 See U.S. Electoral College: Frequently Asked Questions, NAT'L ARCHIVES, 
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/faq.html [http://perma.cc/7HH4-
UUBD] (last visited Feb. 29, 2016) ("Reference sources indicate that over the past 200 
years, over 700 proposals have been introduced in Congress to reform or eliminate the 
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The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC), a 
clever suggestion for switching to a national popular vote 
without having to amend the Constitution, has recently gained 
momentum and attention.342 The NPVIC leverages the states' 
ability to decide how to allocate their own electoral votes; states 
agree to award their electoral votes to the winner of the 
national popular vote, but only when enough states to 
constitute a majority of the Electoral College have signed on.a4a 
The NPVIC would almost certainly open the door to 
further reform and would thereby make it much easier to get 
UOCAVA into the discussion. It seems likely that if the NPVIC 
passed or was close to passing, and if quick and definitive 
review of it in court seemed doubtful, Congress would at least 
consider taking up the issue of amending the Constitution. 
This is not to say that Congress would necessarily 
approve of a popular-vote amendment.344 The point is that the 
NPVIC would thrust the issue to the top of the agenda, and 
anyone who was not completely satisfied with the NPVIC's 
result would likely seek a constitutional amendment to 
preempt or alter it. This could include traditionalists who 
would want to keep the status quo (though if the NPVIC was 
close to passage such an effort would seem futile). It could also 
include those who approved. of the NPVIC's result and who 
wished to accelerate it, or who worried about its vulnerability 
in court and the dangerous uncertainty that it might entail and 
so wished to shore it up. 
For our purposes, though, the most important group 
that would seize upon the opportunity presented by the NPVIC 
would be those interested in broadening the franchise. If 
Congress amends the Constitution to institute a national 
popular vote for President, it would present a perfect 
opportunity to discuss just what the proper scope of "national" 
should be. It would be an optimal time, in other words, to add 
Electoral College. There have been more proposals for Constitutional amendments on 
changing the Electoral College than on any other subject."). 
342 See NAT'L POPULAR VOTE, http://nationalpopularvote.com [http://perma.cc/ 
9QYK-WYQB] (last visited Feb. 29, 2016) (indicating that the plan is 61% of the way 
toward activation); see also JOHN R. KOZA ET AL., EVERY VOTE EQUAL: A STATE-BASED 
PLAN FOR ELECTING THE PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE (2013); Bennett, 
supra note 6 (providing an early version of the plan). 
343 See Explanation of National Popular Vote Bill, NAT'L POPULAR VOTE, 
http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/written-explanation [http://perma.cc/5AFC-9NPH] 
(last visited Feb. 29, 2016). 
344 A popular-vote amendment came close to passing around the time that 
OCVRA did. See KOZA ET AL., supra note 342, at 128. 
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presidential voting rights for residents of the territories.345 In 
the process, the proffered constitutional amendment could 
guarantee presidential voting rights to all adult U.S. citizens,346 
with Congress empowered to provide for the administration of 
voting by anyone who does not reside in any state. Presumably, 
territorial governments could handle their own elections; the 
federal government could take care of voting by permanent 
expatriates. This would be a marked improvement over the 
current systems for overseas voting, which require the federal 
government to attempt to oversee the diverse practices of each 
individual state.a47 
This could lead to placing UOCAVA on a sounder 
constitutional· footing. Permanent expatriates would be able to 
vote for President based solely on their status as American 
citizens, rather than by forcing states to pretend that those 
citizens still live there. This, in turn, would make it easier to 
execute the same maneuver for congressional voting; states would 
no longer be forced to include nonresidents in their electorates. 
Just as with the D.C. solution, Congress could create a position for 
a nonvoting House member dedicated to representing permanent 
expatriates. Better yet, since the Constitution would be getting 
amended anyway, Congress could take the opportunity to add real 
congressional representation for D.C., the territories, and 
permanent expatriates. Unlike with the D.C. solution, permanent 
expatriates could gain these more solid, constitutionally sound 
voting rights without impinging on D.C. residents. 
There are multiple options for fixing UOCA VA and 
placing voting rights for permanent expatriates on a sounder 
constitutional footing. None are perfect. Some require permanent 
expatriates to surrender their right to vote in congressional 
elections. Replacing the right to vote in congressional elections in 
one's former state with the right to vote for a dedicated nonvoting 
representative might suffice, though. If the price to pay to avoid 
UOCAVA's unconstitutionality is to give permanent expatriates 
the same congressional voting rights as American citizens living 
in D.C. and the territories, it is worth it. 
345 The NPVIC itself would only count the popular vote of the 50 states and 
D.C. See Explanation of National Popular Vote Bill, supra note 343. Both major parties 
already allow the territories to vote in their presidential primaries. 
346 See Cottle, supra note 254, at 321-31 (proposing an amendment extending 
presidential voting rights to residents of the territories). Felons, and perhaps ex-felons, 
would likely be excluded. 
347 See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON ELECTION ADMIN., THE AMERICAN VOTING 
EXPERIENCE 59-60 (2014), https://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2014/0l/Amer-Voting-
Exper-final-draft-01-09-14-508.pdf [http://perma.cc/K72E-6TAT]. 
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The cleanest option for preserving permanent expatriates' 
right to vote in presidential elections would require amending the 
Constitution, but constitutional amendments are so difficult to 
pass that one cannot blithely consider this as a likely solution. 
But linking permanent-expatriate voting rights to an amendment 
that establishes voting rights for residents of the territories-or 
one that establishes a national popular vote for President-would 
make it a more promising path politically and legally. Not only 
could such an amendment resolve all of the constitutional 
problems with UOCAVA's application to presidential voting, it 
·might even lead to real representation in the House-all while 
finally enfranchising residents of D.C. and the territories. 
CONCLUSION 
UOCAVA is unconstitutional but entrenched because so 
many people are understandably more concerned with voting 
rights than with constitutional niceties. The list of policy goals for 
which the Constitution has been thrown overboard is long, but 
broadening the franchise is one of the worthier items on it. Yet as 
this article has demonstrated, there is no reason that voting 
rights for permanent expatriates needs to be on that list at all. 
Permanent expatriates can be enfranchised without disrespecting 
the Constitution, through a process that expands federal voting 
rights not just for permanent expatriates but for all U.S. citizens. 
To the extent that we need constitutional amendments to make 
that happen, the same support for UOCAVA that has made it so 
invulnerable should make those amendments (relatively) easy to 
pass because expanding voting rights for deserving citizens has so 
often proven to be a fruitful rallying point for amending the 
Constitution. UOCA VA's principles can be entrenched the old 
fashioned way: by writing them into the Constitution. 
